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ABSTRACT 
 
The life insurance industry’s ability to access genetic test results has raised public concern 
regarding loss of privacy and discrimination.  The insurer requires access to genetic test 
results to reduce the impact of individuals changing their insurance purchasing behaviour 
based on a predictive genetic test result, of which the insurer is unaware (anti-selection).  In 
South Africa, industry guidelines have been established to reduce the risk of genetic 
discrimination whilst enabling insurance companies’ access to this information for 
appropriate assessment of insurance risk.  This study was the first to investigate the use of 
genetic tests by the life insurance industry of South Africa and their compliance with the 
guidelines, in order to identify behaviour that could result in genetic discrimination or 
unexpected risk exposure for the insurer.  A structured interview process was conducted with 
13 companies (8 insurance companies and 5 reinsurance companies), representing the 
individual life insurance industry.  The interview guide was structured in a manner to gain 
insight into the companies’ approach to using genetic information, including genetic test 
results, in defining the policy terms of an individual’s life insurance contract. This study found 
that the companies’ responses to genetic information, particularly genetic test results, were 
demonstrated to be aligned with the regulatory guidelines.  Irregularities in their processes 
were noted and these could lead to discrimination or increased risk exposure for the 
insurance company.  These resulted from inconsistencies noted in the companies’ 
understanding of the genetic disease mechanisms of a medical condition, which is used to 
interpret the genetic information to assign risk. In conclusion, this study identified the need 
for a consistent approach to the interpretation of genetic information which would reduce the 
risk of genetic discrimination. This may be established through the support of specialist 
genetic services.    
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GLOSSARY 
TERM DESCRIPTION 
Actuarial fairness 
There is a good statistical reason or basis for the 
classification of a risk 
Actuarial relevance 
Information that has been demonstrated to place an insurer 
in a better position to more accurately predict the risk of a life 
event occurring 
Applicant The individual applying for life insurance cover 
Applicant’s risk 
The financial exposure of the insurance company should the 
insured experience a life event within a particular time frame 
from the commencement of the policy 
Benefit amount (sum 
assured) 
The monetary amount payable on the occurrence of the life 
event which the insurance benefit is covering 
Benefit expiry age The maximum age until which a benefit provides cover   
Compulsory insurance 
Individuals do not have a choice in the terms of the insurance 
policy and everyone is treated the same regardless of their 
risk profile 
Critical illness benefit 
(also termed  severe 
illness benefit or dread 
disease) 
Provides financial support for financial difficulties associated 
with an individual being diagnosed with particular life-
threatening conditions e.g. cancer. 
Decline Cover is denied 
Defer 
Cover is delayed for a defined period or until a specified 
event occurs 
Disability insurance 
An insurance benefit payable on disablement and to replace 
income if the disability  renders the individual unable to work 
Exclusion 
A defined medical condition is excluded from being covered 
under an insurance policy 
Family history (relevant) 
A family history of members that have been diagnosed with 
the same medical condition that provides an indication of the 
risk of another family member being affected 
Gene fault (mutation) 
 
A change in the genetic material of a gene which is 
associated with disease 
 xv 
 
Genetic condition 
A heritable medical condition caused by a change in the 
genetic information (DNA, RNA, chromosomes and other 
regulatory factors).  These conditions can be divided into two 
broad categories based on their genetic inheritance, these 
are:  single-gene and multifactorial 
Genetic determinism 
An individual’s genetic make-up defines everything about 
them.  Genetics is deemed as the only cause of all 
‘problems’, over which the individuals has no control  
Genetic discrimination 
An asymptomatic individual, or their family, is treated 
differently from people considered to have a ‘normal’ 
genotype based on their actual or presumed genetic 
differences or characteristics 
 
Genetic disease 
mechanisms 
 
For the purpose of this study refers to mode of inheritance, 
penetrance, level of expressivity of the disease and age of 
onset 
Genetic information 
Information about an individual’s genetic tests or the genetic 
tests of the individual’s family members, and the 
manifestation of the disease or disorder in family members, 
including the request or receipt of genetic services or 
participation in clinical research that includes genetic 
services, for both the individual and their family members  
Genetic test 
 
“The direct analysis of DNA, RNA or chromosomes for the 
purposes of determining inherited predisposition to a 
particular disease or group of diseases”(LOA, 2001) 
Insurance company or 
Insurer 
The company that provides insurance 
Insured 
The individual for whom protection for the insured event is 
provided 
Legislative prohibition A restriction on the actions of the insurer, governed by law 
Life cover benefit (death 
benefit) 
An insurance benefit payable on death 
Load 
Increase in the standard premium rates based on an 
increase in the applicant’s risk profile compared with the risk 
pool 
 xvi 
 
Moratorium 
A voluntary agreement between insurers that specifies that 
for a defined time period they agree not to request certain 
information 
Multifactorial 
Inheritance controlled by many genes (polygenic) with small 
additive effects and the impact of environment 
Principle of mutuality 
(equity) 
Individuals are pooled together based on shared risk profiles, 
and everyone within a specific pool will pay similar premiums 
Penetrance 
The number of people that carry a specific mutation that 
express the disease  
Premium 
Payment made to the insurance company by the insured for 
the life insurance cover provided 
Policy of insurance 
(insurance policy) 
The legal contract detailing the terms of the provision of 
insurance  
Prophylactic treatment Treatment that can prevent or limit the spread of a disease 
Reinsurance company 
Financial institution that provides insurance to insurance 
companies 
Single-gene disorder 
(monogenic) 
A medical condition controlled by the action of a single  gene 
locus 
Principle of solidarity 
(equality) 
Premiums are a fixed percentage of an individual’s income 
and the benefits and benefit amounts are predefined, 
regardless of the individual’s needs and risk profile 
Standard rates 
The premium rate based on the risk profile of all individuals 
within a specific risk pool 
Standard underwriting 
requirements 
Information received at application stage prior to the 
insurance company performing any evaluation of the 
applicant’s risk 
Term policy The insurance cover is provided for a defined period of time  
Underwriting Risk classification of an applicant 
Underwriting decision 
The contractual terms applied to the policy of insurance 
based on the risk profile of the individual 
Voluntary insurance 
Individuals have the choice in terms of when to purchase 
insurance, the type of insurance benefits they require and the 
benefit amount. 
Waiting period 
A defined period of time prior to financial protection being 
afforded 
 xvii 
 
 
Please note: Terms are italicised when used in the text 
 
 
Whole of life 
The insurance cover is provided for the whole of the 
insured’s life or until benefit expiry age 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
The science of human genetics has progressed significantly in the past two decades, and 
especially since the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2001.  Increased 
knowledge of genetics has provided new opportunities to elucidate disease mechanisms, 
improve diagnosis, predict disease, and develop new treatments.   These proposed benefits 
are often overshadowed by the public’s fear of loss of privacy if their genetic information 
becomes available, specifically to employers and insurance companies.  The use of genetic 
tests in these settings impacts on the legal, social and ethical aspects of communities 
(Taylor, Treloar, Barlow-Stewart, Stranger, & Otlowski, 2008).  It is therefore important to 
establish how genetic tests are used in these environments and assess whether the resulting 
actions justify the public’s fears.  To determine how genetic tests are used in the individual 
life insurance industry of South Africa is therefore of value and is the focus of this study. 
1.1 What is insurance? 
 
Insurance provides financial protection on the unpredictable occurrence of a specified event 
(insured event) in exchange for a payment amount, or premium (Malpas, 2008). 
 
The different types of insurance are distinguished by the ‘insured event’ that they cover.  
Insurance can provide financial protection for the loss or damage of assets e.g. motor 
vehicle insurance or on the occurrence of a ‘health event’ such as accessing health care 
services, or a ‘life event’ for example chronic illness, disability or death.  Health insurance 
provides financial protection on the occurrence of a ‘health event’, and life insurance 
provides the insured protection for a ‘life event’.   
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1.1.1 Life insurance benefits 
There are three main types of life insurance benefits or products based on specific life 
events, these are:  
• Life cover (death benefit) – payable on death, to provide dependants with financial 
security  
• Disability insurance – payable on disablement and to replace income if the disability  
renders the individual unable to work 
• Critical illness benefit (also known as severe illness and dread disease) – provides for 
financial difficulties associated with diagnosis of a life-threatening condition e.g. 
cancer or severe trauma.   
The exact terms and conditions of these benefits differ per insurer as do the costs of 
accessing these benefits. 
1.1.2 Insurance funding structures and premium calculations 
Theoretically, the premium amount should be proportional to the applicant’s risk.  This risk is 
the financial exposure of the insurance company should the insured experience a life event 
within a particular time frame (Knoppers, Lemmens, Godard, Joly, Avard et al., 2004).  If this 
method were used to calculate premiums it would make accessing insurance too expensive. 
Therefore, insurance is funded by the insurer pooling individual premiums together and 
investing this lump sum.  Insurance benefits are then paid from this invested amount 
(Malpas, 2008).   
 
There are two options for funding structures that can be used by the insurance company.  
The structure selected is defined by whether the insurance cover is provided on a 
compulsory or voluntary basis.  With compulsory insurance everyone who is insured is 
treated the same regardless of their risk.  This is known as the principle of ‘solidarity’ or 
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equality.  Everyone pays the same percentage of income or a fixed amount, for a predefined 
benefit amount, regardless of their personal financial needs and circumstances (Pokorski, 
1997; Bennett & Smith, 2007).  Thus the premiums are structured on affordability.  Examples 
of this type of insurance include: employer provided benefits (group benefits), Workmen’s 
Compensation Fund, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom (UK) and private 
medical schemes in South Africa.  
 
Voluntary insurance allows individuals to be more selective and choose when to purchase 
insurance, define the benefits they require as well as the benefit amounts.  With voluntary 
insurance individuals are grouped together into risk pools based on their individual risk 
(Knoppers et al., 2004).  Individuals within a single risk pool will therefore all have a similar 
risk profile and the premiums they pay will be similar.  This is the principle of ‘mutuality’ or 
equity (Pokorski, 1997).      
1.1.3 The process of risk assessment of an application  
Equity is achieved by the insurer assigning individuals to a particular risk pool based on 
various factors that influence their risk, such as age, gender, occupation, income, education 
and health status.  This process of risk selection and classification is called underwriting.  
The resulting risk classification enables the insurer to define the contractual terms of the 
policy of insurance, known as the underwriting decision.  The different terms include; 
providing the policy at standard rates (the rate for all individuals within a specific risk pool), 
applying terms and conditions to the policy due to increased risk exposure (a waiting period, 
exclusions, or a loading of the standard rate) or decline the cover.  Internationally, the 
percentage ratio of policies provided on these terms is 90% to 95% for standard rates, with 
about 4% for terms and 1% declined (Pokorski, 1997; Low, King, & Wilkie, 1998;Knoppers et 
al., 2004). 
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Risk classification is based on the information received by the insurer.  The insurer uses this 
information to make a ‘just’ and ‘fair’ decision (Pokorski, 1997; Knoppers et al., 2004; Dodge 
& Christianson, 2007).   This risk classification or discrimination is based on the principle of 
‘actuarial fairness’, meaning that there is a sound actuarial basis to classify the risk.  
Underwriting information therefore needs to be actuarially relevant and by having access to 
the information, an insurer will be in a better position to more accurately predict the risk of a 
life event occurring.  The information can only be deemed relevant when an association has 
been established between it and the occurrence of an event e.g. the risk of death increases 
with age based on statistical evidence (Daykin et al., 2003).  Therefore the greater the 
predictive value of the information, the greater and more accurate the risk assignment. This 
actuarial relevance is not always easy to define especially when considering the use of 
genetic information. 
1.2 Use of genetic and non-genetic information for underwriting  
 
For the insurance industry the distinction between genetic and non-genetic information is 
vague (Pokorski, 1997).  This is illustrated in their definition for genetic information which is 
the “information about an individual’s genetic tests or the genetic tests of the individual’s 
family members, and the manifestation of the disease or disorder in family members” 
including “the request or receipt of genetic services or participation in clinical research that 
includes genetic services, for both the individual and their family members” (Coalition for 
Genetic Fairness, 2008) and their “family history, physical examination and past treatment” 
(Pokorski, 1997). 
 
Genetic information is currently available to insurers through family history, blood tests, 
medical history and medical examinations (American Academy of Actuaries, 1998).  
Examples of non-genetic tests that provide genetic information include ultrasound for 
polycystic kidney disease, cholesterol tests and blood pressure readings.  Family medical 
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history has been used for more than a century by insurers, and mortality ratings for 
hereditary factors have been established since 1932 (Pokorski, 1997; Raeburn, 2002).   
 
The use of genetic information is not new or unique to insurance, and to date there have 
been no reports of discrimination in its use (Morrison, 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the shift in the general public’s perception that the use of this information can 
now be harmful, is due to a new awareness of genetic testing and availability of genetic 
tests. 
 
The public seems to fear that making genetic tests available to insurers will lead to genetic 
discrimination which will limit access to insurance, impact existing insurance policies, affect 
medical underwriting, remove privacy of medical information and affect claims and 
affordability of cover (Christianson, 2007).  Besides accessing genetic test results, it is 
argued that if insurers can request a genetic test, an individual may be forced to have a test 
that could potentially provide them with information they do not want to know (Laurie, 2000). 
Insurers would like access to genetic test results to protect themselves against being 
exposed to the cost of unexpected risks, to maintain competitiveness, for future uncertainty 
and to remain in business (Christianson, 2007).  
1.2.1 The life insurance industry’s interpretation of a genetic test  
Genetic tests have been deemed as unique and different from other tests in terms of the 
depth of information they reveal about an individual (Hall & Rich, 2000).  In the realm of 
insurance the use of genetic tests has received special attention compared with other 
underwriting information.   
 
In the literature there are many ways in which a genetic test has been defined for the 
insurance industry.  Some definitions are all encompassing including “all products of any 
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gene” (Knoppers et al., 2004) while others are more specific: “the presence of a variation 
noted at the level of the DNA, RNA or chromosomes that is predictive of a disease or 
disorder” (LOA, 2001).   
 
A number of these definitions would include tests currently used by insurers e.g. a 
cholesterol test.  As a genetic test is considered as being unique, it is then preferable to 
define it based on its unique features.  Internationally, various non-statutory committees 
addressing this issue have stated that the aim of a genetic test is “to examine the structure of 
the chromosomes or detect abnormal patterns in the DNA of specific genes.  It does not 
apply to non-genetic medical tests for example blood or urine tests for cholesterol, prostate, 
cancer, liver function or diabetes” (Morrison, 2005).   
1.2.2 Establishing the value of a genetic test to the life insurance industry  
Genetic tests that are useful to an insurer are defined by their predictive and/or therapeutic 
value, but the number of these tests currently available is limited (Harper, 1997).   
 
The value of the genetic test can be defined by genetic disease mechanisms specific to the 
genetic disorder being tested such as: mode of inheritance, penetrance (i.e. the number of 
people that carry a gene fault who express the disease), level of expressivity of the disease 
and age of onset.  The mode of inheritance is used to categorise genetic conditions into two 
broad categories, these are:  single-gene (monogenic) genetic disorders, where the disease 
results from a change in a single gene; and multifactorial genetic disorders, where the 
inheritance of disease is controlled by many genes with an additive effect (polygenic) and is 
affected by the environment (Harper, 1997).   
 
Other factors that are of importance to the value of a test include preventability of the 
condition and cost effectiveness of the test (ease by which a mutation is identified for an 
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individual from a specific population) (Turnpenny & Ellard, 2005; Burger, 2008). Table 1.1 
shows how one genetic mechanism, the mode of inheritance, confers the value or relevance 
of the genetic test for the underwriting process.   
 
Table 1.1 :Genetic inheritance and relevance to insurers (modified from Harper, 1997) 
 
Genetic Inheritance 
Pattern 
Relevance of the genetic test result 
to the life insurance 
Examples 
Autosomal 
dominant 
 
Diseases with late-onset  
and progressive course 
Very relevant to insurers 
 
Huntington disease, other late onset 
neurodegenerative disorders, adult 
polycystic kidney disease, familial cancer 
syndromes,  
Marfan syndrome and familial 
hypercholesterolaemia 
Autosomal 
recessive 
 
Usually early onset  
Carriers are usually healthy 
Usually of little relevance to insurers 
Cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anaemia 
X-linked 
 
Risk to males only 
Disease presents early 
Female carriers are usually healthy 
Little relevance to insurers 
Haemophilia 
 
Chromosomal 
abnormality 
Usually early onset 
Carriers are usually healthy 
Usually Not relevant to insurers 
Down syndrome, translocations 
 
Multifactorial 
disorder 
 
Common disorders 
Level of predictability is low 
Currently little actuarial relevance  
 
Diabetes, Alzheimer’s and  
cardiovascular disease 
 
Genetic test results are not the only valuable indicator for life insurance risk assessment as 
other factors influence the development of a genetic illness (Pokorski, 1997).  This 
phenomenon is illustrated by comparing a gene test result for Huntington disease (HD) and 
inherited breast and ovarian cancer (IBOC) (BRCA1).  For Huntington disease, if a region of 
the HD gene displays a number of repeats in the genetic code greater than 40, it can be said 
that the individual has a 99.9% probability of developing the disease.  However this 
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predictive ‘diagnosis’ cannot provide an accurate indication of ‘timing’ for this late-onset 
condition, and onset can range from the age of 25 to 65, and beyond these parameters 
(Warby, Graham, & Hayden, 2007). The identification of a mutation in the BRCA1 gene 
confers a probability of 40% to 80% that an individual will develop breast cancer, thus 
displaying a variable penetrance (Evans, Kerr, & Lalloo, 2006), and a 30% to 60% risk of 
developing ovarian cancer, suggestive of variable expressivity (Evans, 2006).  The individual 
that has a mutation that denotes a predisposition towards cancer can alter their risk of 
developing cancer by accessing prophylactic treatment, such as a bilateral mastectomy.  
This action can reduce their risk of developing breast cancer by 90% (McGilllivary, 2006).  
These examples demonstrate that genetic tests do provide risk information but their 
interpretation differs substantially, as do the management options.   
 
There are also genetic tests that insurers can use that may favourably affect an individual’s 
risk profile (Malpas, 2008). Negative test results for highly predictive genetic tests denote 
that the individual is not at risk of developing the disorder and an individual’s risk profile can 
be improved through preventative measures in response to a positive predictive test, where 
available.   
 
The value of genetic tests is to assess the risk of a disease, and hence it is important to 
address the concerns of the insurers and the public relating to the use of genetic tests by the 
insurance industry. 
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1.3 Concerns relating to the use of genetic tests by the life insurance 
industry 
1.3.1 Genetic discrimination 
The main fear of the insured population regarding the insurance industry’s use of genetic 
tests, is genetic discrimination.  Genetic discrimination occurs “when an asymptomatic 
individual or their family is treated differently from people considered to have a ‘normal’ 
genotype based on their actual or presumed genetic differences or characteristics” (Billings, 
Kohn, de Cuevas, Beckwith, Alper et al., 1992; Taylor et al., 2008).  Applicants may receive 
adverse terms on their insurance policy based on their genetic status, but if these decisions 
are proven to be actuarially fair, then this cannot be considered as discrimination.  The 
presumed impact of genetic discrimination is that individuals who would usually be deemed 
as healthy are no longer considered so because of their genetic or risk status, based on the 
insurers’ understanding of the genetic condition (Ashcroft, 2007).  It is postulated that this 
level of genetic discrimination could potentially create a “new intermediate health category” 
of neither healthy nor ill, a “genetic underclass”, the “healthy ill”, or the “genetically impaired” 
(Bennett & Smith, 2007).   In this scenario it is assumed that these individuals would not be 
able to access insurance and that the information would affect existing policies and benefits.    
 
The public’s fears are not just limited to accessing insurance, but also that their social right to 
access genetic testing or participate in clinical research is affected based on the 
consequence of discrimination.  These fears are founded on an assumption that the 
information a genetic test reveals is unique and different (Hall & Rich, 2000).  The effect of 
placing genetic tests into a unique category from other tests could lead to genetic 
determinism (geneticisation), where an individual’s genetic make-up defines everything 
about them.  This implies that genetics is the only cause of all ‘problems’, and the individuals 
have no control over the effects thereof.  This reasoning leads to a limited distinction 
between genetic discrimination, where people are treated differently based on their genetic 
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status, and genetic determinism, where an individual’s genetic status over which they have 
no control, makes them different (von Hoyweghen, Hortsman, & Schepers, 2007).  The 
impact of defining a genetic test as unique is counterproductive as it does not protect an 
individual but potentially provides a platform for discrimination. 
 
Proof of genetic discrimination is limited, especially as the industry is not certain how 
prevalent it is, how to measure it, and what its true effect is (Bennett & Smith, 2007). Studies 
performed to date have been deemed as anecdotal, criticised for inflating the level of 
discrimination, and for using inappropriate sampling methods (Hall & Rich, 2000).  
Conversely, it has even been suggested that the phenomenon does not exist (Hall & Rich, 
2000).  The lack of credible data may be because genetic tests are only relevant to about 1% 
of the insured population and there is limited use of genetic testing services.  The latter is 
probably due to the cost of genetic testing, lack of awareness of these services and the 
limited number of genetic tests available (Joly, Knoppers, & Godard, 2003; World Health 
Organisation, 2006).   
 
In a North American study of individuals being tested for Huntington disease, 41.6% of the 
individuals personally paid for their tests to prevent insurers from obtaining and using the 
resulting information (Oster, Dorsey, Bausch, Shinaman, Kayson & Oakes, 2008).  A survey 
of breast cancer testing genetic service centres in Europe reported that patients would not 
undergo testing because of fear of the insurer’s response (Morrison, 2005).  In a UK study, 
26% of individuals at risk for breast cancer declined testing for fear of discrimination.  
Contrary to their fears, of those who were tested, more than 80% had no difficulty obtaining 
health insurance (Peterson, Milliron, Lewis, Goold, & Merajver, 2002).    
 
Recently in an Australian study, 916 individuals with a family history or genetic test for a late 
onset genetic disorder (95% had a predictive genetic test) were contacted to determine their 
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perception of the response to genetic information in the insurance market.  Of the 
participants, 42% had experienced incidences of genetic discrimination by insurers, including 
refusal of life insurance, cover offered at special rates and increased loadings on insurance 
policies.  Of these participants who had experienced genetic discrimination, 90% had genetic 
information pertaining to neurodegenerative disorders viz. Huntington disease (HD), 
spinocerebellar ataxia (SCA) and familial cancers (Taylor et al., 2008).    
 
These findings were confirmed by Canadian researchers who recently reported that 40% of 
their study population, which consisted of tested and untested asymptomatic people at risk 
for Huntington disease, reported some form of genetic discrimination, and reported that the 
insurance industry represented 29.2% of these cases.  The insurance companies were more 
likely to discriminate in response to a family history of Huntington disease than to a genetic 
test (Bombard, Veenstra, Friedman, Creighton, Currie, Paulsen et al., 2009)  
 
These studies are suggestive of genetic discrimination, but they do not assess whether the 
insurers behaved differently based on genetic information in comparison to other risk 
information, which is the basis used to define this discrimination. 
1.3.2 Anti-selection 
The main reason for insurers wanting access to a genetic test result is to reduce the impact 
of individuals changing their insurance purchasing behaviour based on a predictive genetic 
test result which they have concealed from the insurer (Knoppers et al., 2004).   
 
Insurance policies are structured on an element of ‘utmost faith’ meaning that insurers need 
the same information that the applicant has so that there is no imbalance in risk perception.   
Asymmetry occurs when the insurer has restricted access to information either by legislation 
or failure of disclosure by the applicant.  The latter is termed ‘adverse selection’ or ‘anti-
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selection’ and occurs when an individual intentionally obtains insurance cover with 
knowledge of the increased risk of an insured event occurring but without providing the 
insurer with that information.  The motivation for their actions is to take financial advantage of 
the underwriting process (Actuarial Standards Board, 1989; National Society of Genetic 
Counselors, 2006). 
 
 Anti-selection affects the insurers’ ability to maintain the financial stability of the insurance 
pool, and results in people purchasing more cover than necessary, submitting claims earlier 
than expected and selectively choosing when to buy insurance (Pokorski, 1997).  Thus 
insurers pay out more claims than expected because of the additional undisclosed risk. In 
extreme situations this could lead to the collapse of the insurance company, or to remain 
profitable, insurers will have to charge higher premiums for everyone. 
 
Although adverse selection has been proven to be a definite phenomenon, it has not been 
convincingly demonstrated in the context of an insurer’s access to genetic tests.  The results 
from two studies that investigated the effect of BRCA testing on insurance purchasing 
behaviour were inconclusive (Zick, Smith, Mayer, & Botkin, 2000; Armstrong et al., 2003;).  
Another study reported that individuals who tested positive for the Apolipoprotein E gene 
(associated with Alzheimer’s disease), changed their insurance purchasing behaviour by 
almost a factor of 6 in comparison to those that were not tested, indicating that a risk of anti-
selection does exist (Zick, Mathews, Roberts, & Cook-Deegan, 2005). 
 
Contrary to the insurers’ fears of anti-selection, one author was of the opinion that the feared 
effect of anti-selection is inflated because insurers protect themselves against this risk by 
including the cost thereof in the premiums (le Grys, 1997).  The standard premium 
calculation incorporates a financial buffer against the effect of anti-selection in the first five 
years of the policy, thereafter an insurer will be able to provide for the risk financially.  This 
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premium rate is however only sufficient for the current number of genetic tests available, and 
this calculation would need to be reviewed if genetic tests for more common diseases 
become available (Viswanathan, Lemaire, Withers, & Armstrong, 2007).   
1.3.3 Importance of addressing these concerns  
As described, there is little evidence of genetic discrimination or adverse selection however 
these remain genuine fears for the respective parties.  The topic is emotive, as access to 
insurance is deemed a social right. Proof of public fear exists and although considered 
irrational, it needs to be addressed (Joly et al., 2003).  The consequences of not addressing 
these fears may result in individuals accessing genetic testing and management through 
sources that do not provide appropriate genetic and medical support services (Murthy, 
Dixon, & Mossialos, 2001).  A balance between the needs of the insurers’ and the applicants’ 
is required (Godard, Raeburn, Pembrey, Bobrow, Farndon et al., 2003).   
 
Responses to these fears have been variable; some writers conclude that genetic 
information should not be disclosed to insurers, that doctors need to prevent this information 
from getting out, unless they have consent; and that genetic counsellors should tell patients 
of the insurance risks.  Medical practitioners have suggested that patients purchase 
insurance prior to testing and certain support groups have requested that doctors set up two 
records for their patients, only one accessible to the insurer (Pokorski, 1997).  The Australian 
National Health and Medical Research Council recommended that, prior to testing, patients 
should be informed by the genetic counselling services of the implications that a genetic test 
will have on their ability to purchase insurance (Lynch, Doherty, Gaff, Macrae, & Lindeman, 
2003). 
 
Insurers have strict guidelines regarding what information may be deemed ‘relevant’ for 
underwriting, and actuaries are “trained to distinguish between appearances and fact” 
 14 
 
(American Academy of Actuaries, 1998).  None of the commentaries have taken these facts 
into consideration, and the attitudes towards insurers have tended to be hostile (Raeburn, 
2002).  Contrary to public opinion insurers are aware that a positive test for a gene mutation 
does not always translate into disease.  Furthermore, the fear of life insurance companies 
cancelling policies based on new information received is unfounded as an insurance contract 
does not make allowance for this action (American Academy of Actuaries, 1998).  
 
In 2000, participants at a workshop organised by the European Society of Human Genetics 
Public and Professional Policy Committee identified the various issues pertaining to the use 
of genetic information and testing by the insurance industry.  Key recommendations were 
that a definition for predictive genetic information and genetic tests needs to be established; 
an interpretation of the predictive genetic test results is required for risk categorisation in 
mutuality costed insurance policies; an opinion of anti-selection is needed; the effect on risk 
assessment by the type of insurance product should be established; the lack of genetic 
services (such as genetic counselling) needs to be addressed, and reduced testing because 
of fears of discrimination needs to be investigated (Godard et al., 2003).   
1.4 Regulation of the use of genetic tests by the insurance industry  
 
Governments, specialists in the disciplines of health policy, genetics and insurance, and 
other interested parties have investigated ways to limit or prevent the negative effects of the 
use of genetic tests by insurers.  Their solutions have included the introduction of various 
legal, regulatory or industry focused models. 
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1.4.1 Regulatory policy models 
International solutions to the insurers’ use of genetic tests are founded on three industry 
specific policy models: 1) legislative prohibition; 2) moratorium; or 3) status quo (Bennett & 
Smith, 2007).  Another approach has been to strengthen privacy policies restricting access 
to information and to enforce rigorous control and regulation as to the availability of genetic 
tests (Knoppers et al., 2004). 
1.4.1.1 Legislative prohibition 
 
The motivation behind legislative prohibition, or restriction of insurers’ access to genetic 
tests, was to protect all parties involved.  Genetic discrimination is therefore prevented, 
providing freedom for individuals to undergo genetic testing (Hall & Rich, 2000).  The risk of 
legislative prohibition is that it can reinforce ‘genetic exceptionalism’ and increase the risk of 
‘anti-selection’ (Lemmens, Joly, & Knoppers, 2004).   This model may be chosen as a result 
of the complexity experienced in identifying the actuarial relevance of genetic test results.  
However, as the insurers’ understanding of the science increases, this approach will need to 
be reconsidered (Bennett & Smith, 2007).    
1.4.1.2 Moratorium 
 
A moratorium is a voluntary agreement between insurers that specifies that for a defined 
time period they agree not to request genetic tests or use the results.  Thus it provides the 
public with a sense of comfort, and it allows time for actuarial validation of genetic tests and 
their use in the insurance industry ( Lemmens et al., 2004; Bennett & Smith, 2007).   
 
Both the moratorium and legislative models do not make allowance for genetic tests that are 
already proven to be of actuarial relevance.  The effectiveness of these models can be 
enhanced by incorporating a proportional approach, where access to information is permitted 
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based on specific provisos.  These provisos may include specific benefit or premium 
amounts that define under which circumstances specific genetic tests may be considered for 
a particular policy.  The value and relevance of the genetic test would be defined by an 
independent regulatory body (Lemmens et al., 2004). 
1.4.1.3 Status quo 
 
The reason for maintaining status quo, or to not have a policy, may be to determine the ‘true 
effect’ of allowing insurers access to genetic tests.  From the public’s perspective, this could 
be seen as ‘leaving the door open’ for discrimination, although the policy makers consider 
people to be protected under human rights and privacy laws (Lemmens et al., 2004). 
 
To understand the public’s viewpoint, a study was performed using a citizen jury whom were 
given the task to select the policy model best suited to their needs.  They chose the 
legislation model because they distrusted insurers to act in accordance with a voluntary 
agreement or to treat individuals without prejudicing them based on business needs.  
Legislation seemed to meet the need for trustworthiness as it is enforceable by law (Bennett 
& Smith, 2007). 
1.4.2 International approach to the regulation of the insurance industry’s use of 
genetic tests 
Each of these models, or combinations of them, are represented worldwide.  This was 
illustrated in a comparative study of 44 countries (Lemmens et al., 2004).  The two most 
common options were; the combination of a moratorium and guidelines, and legislation with 
guidelines.  The solutions selected seem to be based on international trends and in response 
to the concerns, policies, insurance structures and debates specific to that country.  The 
different approaches are illustrated in solutions used by the United States of America (USA), 
the United Kingdom (UK), Europe and Australia. 
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1.4.2.1 United States of America 
The USA has adopted the status quo approach to life insurance and each state can act 
according to what they deem necessary (American Academy of Actuaries, 2002). Although 
the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) was passed in May 2008, it only 
applies to health insurers and employers.  The protection afforded by GINA does not apply to 
life insurance companies (Coalition for Genetic Fairness, 2008).   
1.4.2.2 United Kingdom 
 
In the UK the ‘Concordant and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance’ pertains to the life 
insurance industry and was developed by a team including government participants, the 
Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC), the Association of British Insurers (ABI), and the 
Human Genetics Commission (HGC) (Raeburn, 2002).  The guidelines state that individuals 
may not be treated differently by insurers based on their predictive genetic test results, and 
that the clinical and actuarial relevance of a specific predictive genetic test would be 
assessed and approved by the GAIC. On approval, insurers and applicants should have 
equal access to information (Genetics and Insurance Commission (GAIC), 2005).   The 
Moratorium states that applicants need only disclose results of a genetic test if the insured 
amount is above a certain value. For these tests, insurers may request results of the test but 
may not require that a test be performed.  They may request family history, but not a genetic 
test result from a family member and applicants may volunteer to provide favourable test 
outcomes to override a decision based on family history.   The only predictive genetic test 
approved to date is for Huntington disease and only for life insurance policies with a benefit 
value greater than £500,000 (Genetics and Insurance Commission (GAIC), 2000).  Of 
existing life insurance policies 97% are below this benefit amount (Genetics and Insurance 
Commission (GAIC), 2005). 
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1.4.2.3 European Union 
 
No single approach is used by the member countries of the European Union, but many have 
established their legislation based on the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 
Oviedo, held by the Council of Europe (CE).  This Convention states that “Any form of 
discrimination against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is prohibited.” 
(Council of Europe (CE), 1997). A genetic test is predictive of a genetic disease and can only 
be performed for health and research purposes subject to appropriate genetic counselling.  
The test is used to identify the presence of a disease-causing mutation (Lemmens et al., 
2004).  This legislation does not protect individuals that have already had a genetic test and 
therefore it is used in conjunction with the UNESCO ‘Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights’ which states that “No one shall be subjected to discrimination, 
based on genetic characteristics, that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity” (UNESCO International Bioethics 
Committee, 1997; Lemmens et al., 2004). 
1.4.2.4 Australia 
 
In Australia, the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited (IFSA) defined 
guidelines were voluntarily agreed to by all registered life insurers.  These guidelines, the 
IFSA ‘Genetic Standard Policy’ were established to ensure that: everyone has access to life 
insurance, risk classification can freely evolve, insurance is priced affordably, the industry 
remains viable for a long time and insurers remain accountable and transparent (IFSA, 
2005).  The agreement provides similar guidelines as those defined by the UK.  In addition, 
they state that no preferential underwriting is permissible based on a genetic test result and 
insurers must consider the value of prophylactic screening and treatment when assessing 
risk (IFSA, 2005).   
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1.4.3 Effectiveness of regulating the use of genetic tests by the insurance 
industry 
Individual countries have based their decisions on their unique needs.  To date the value of 
the various models have not been investigated.  In the USA, an in-depth study was 
performed in the health insurance industry, prior to the inception of GINA, to determine 
whether legislation affected the risk of genetic discrimination (Hall & Rich, 2000).  At the time 
of their study each state had independently implemented either guidelines or prohibitary 
legislation, and the authors compared states with dissimilar laws to establish whether 
legislation had an impact on behaviour.  Based on their observations, they concluded that 
prohibitary law affected insurers’ attitudes towards the social concerns relating to the use of 
genetic tests.  Although advantageous, the authors’ concern was that these laws have 
heightened both geneticists’ and consumers’ perception of the risk of discrimination without 
sufficient substantiating proof of its existence. They could not comment on the effect on 
genetic discrimination as they could not prove its prior existence.   
 
These international responses provide a foundation to assess the process and approach of 
South Africa, whilst not ignoring South Africa’s unique demographics and needs. 
1.5 The South African Life Insurance Industry 
 
South Africa has an estimated population of 48.7 million people from different racial groups: 
blacks 79.4%, whites 9.24%, mixed ancestry 9% and Indians 2.94% (Statistics SA, 2008).  
Overall the unemployment rate is 23.5% of the 30,6 million employable people (Statistics SA, 
2009).  In the context of private insurance this portion of the population would not be 
considered able to access these benefits, due to affordability.  They are however granted 
financial protection through state managed welfare benefits which include disability grants. 
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For the employed population of South Africa, and those with the financial means, insurance 
benefits can be accessed through group schemes, such as membership of a union, funeral 
benefit schemes or employer provided benefits.  Alternatively individuals may obtain 
insurance in their private capacity.   
 
In South Africa the group and private health (medical aid) insurance are community rated, 
similar to solidarity funding, and the option for these insurers to discriminate against an 
applicant is limited.  The sector of the South African insurance industry that may discriminate 
against applicants for underwriting purposes is the individual life insurance industry, and they 
would therefore be in a position to benefit from the use of genetic tests. 
 
The individual life insurance industry in South Africa has a substantial annual premium 
income but the number of insured individuals in South Africa constitutes only 14% of the 
insurable population (FinMark Trust, 2009).  Hence there is a potential for growth in the 
number of insured individuals, and if this occurs, it would result in many people being 
exposed to medical underwriting.  The impact of the underwriting process can therefore 
potentially affect a large portion of the South African population. 
1.5.1 South African Life Insurance Industry: Legislation and Regulation 
The Long-term Insurance Act (the Act) defines the legal framework for the establishment and 
business practices of a life insurance company in South Africa (Republic of South Africa 
Government Gazette, 1998).  The Act does not provide a foundation for underwriting 
practices and the insurers’ right to discriminate is attained through the Constitution and other 
legislation, such as the Privacy Act (Caciumaru, 2007).   
The Life Offices’ Association (LOA) was formed to provide an environment to address the 
interests and concerns of both the life insurance industry and the insured public.  This is an 
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association of registered long-term insurance companies conducting business in South 
Africa and its purpose was to educate the public, negotiate with the authorities and enable 
life insurers to regulate their industry. The latter was achieved through the introduction of the 
LOA Codes of Conduct (LOA Website, 2007), a set of principles to which the LOA member 
companies voluntarily prescribe. The LOA Codes of Conduct consists of 23 chapters, 
covering various aspects of the business of long-term insurance provision and offers a guide 
for best practice (LOA Website, 2007).  
1.5.2 Regulation of the South African life insurance industry’s use of genetic tests  
In November 2001, the LOA released the ‘Code on Genetic Testing’ (LOA Code) (LOA, 
2001).  The LOA Code’s stipulated purpose was to reduce the risk of adverse selection and 
genetic discrimination in the use of genetic tests by the South African life insurance industry. 
The guidelines in the LOA Code were established in consultation with the Australian IFSA 
consultation paper, the British ABI code of practice and a Masters degree thesis, completed 
at the University of Johannesburg, entitled “Underwriting guidelines for genetic testing with 
special reference to relevant ethical aspects” by Dr M van der Walt.    
 
The definition of a genetic test as stipulated in the LOA Code was detailed in section 1.2.1., 
Pg. 5. The LOA Code provides guidelines as to an insurer’s use of genetic tests.  The goal of 
the LOA Code is to ensure affordable and appropriate premiums by allowing insurers to have 
access to results of genetic tests.  These genetic tests had to be performed prior to 
application for insurance, and the results should be underwritten in the same manner as any 
other information received.  The insurer may not request that a genetic test be performed, 
may not request the results of a genetic test performed after commencement of the policy or 
use a genetic test result to reduce premiums lower than standard rates (LOA, 2001).   
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To achieve these goals the LOA Code defines the role of the insurer and key people within 
the company.  The insurer is to ensure limited access by staff members to genetic test 
results, their staff will be trained to have  an understanding of the Code and their compliance 
will be monitored and details of all applicants that had genetic testing will be stored in a 
separate database.  A senior underwriter will be responsible for genetic information and the 
chief medical officer will keep the company informed of developments in genetic testing, 
provide training regarding genetics, consult with specialists regarding genetic testing cases 
and provide advice for complex cases (LOA, 2001). 
 
At the end of 2008, the LOA disbanded and was incorporated into the Association for 
Savings and Investments South Africa (ASISA).  This association represents the majority of 
asset managers, collective schemes managers and life insurance companies in South Africa.  
Their function is to engage with policymakers, regulators, intermediaries and consumers 
(ASISA Website, 2009). 
In 2009, ASISA’s Medical Underwriting Standards Committee (MUSC) reviewed the Code 
and in April 2009 released the “ASISA Standard on Genetic Testing” (the Standard).  The 
amendments were that an insurer is obligated to review the terms of a policy if an applicant 
provides the results of a predictive genetic test, and when assessing an individual’s risk 
profile the insurer should take the value of specialist surveillance, medical intervention and 
successful treatment into consideration (ASISA Website, 2009).   
Although these standards are not legally binding, support for the various parties is provided 
through the Long-term Insurance Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) whose function is to 
mediate disputes between insurers and the insured including cases where there is a concern 
of genetic discrimination or adverse selection (Long term insurance ombudsman, 2008). 
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1.6 Motivation for this study 
 
The value of any form of guideline, regulation or legislation is determined by whether it 
achieves its stated goals.  In the context of the insurance industry’s use of genetic tests, the 
goal of any regulation established would be to reduce the risk of ‘genetic discrimination’ 
whilst providing insurers with the opportunity to manage their risks effectively and 
appropriately.  These goals are specifically stated in the British, Australian and South African 
guidelines (Genetics and Insurance Commission (GAIC), 2005; IFSA, 2005). 
 
The effectiveness of these polices has been poorly researched and is complicated by the 
lack of evidence of both genetic discrimination and anti-selection.  Such an investigation 
would need to establish whether insurers have aligned their business practices to the 
recommended guidelines and, if they have, the effect that this has had on their ability to 
discriminate based on genetic information and their risk of being exposed to anti-selection.   
 
As there is little documented proof of genetic discrimination, a way to measure this 
phenomenon is to identify individuals that have been treated differently based on genetic 
information. This can be achieved by comparing underwriting practices and outcomes 
associated with different types of underwriting information, including both genetic and non-
genetic information.  The assessment of the existence of genetic discrimination can be 
further strengthened by specifically comparing the different outcomes based on different 
forms of genetic information e.g. genetic test versus family history (Hall & Rich, 2000).  In all 
instances the actuarial relevance of the genetic test must be taken into consideration and the 
insurers must have aligned their business practices with the LOA Code.  
This type of investigation has not been done in South Africa.  Two studies have considered 
these aspects; one relating to the risk of adverse selection and the other genetic 
discrimination (Kotze, Schoorn, & Coetzer, 2004; Caciumaru, 2007).  The one was an 
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informal survey establishing the insurance purchasing behaviour of individuals when 
receiving a positive genetic predisposition result for cardiac disease. The author concluded 
that there is a potential risk of adverse selection (Caciumaru, 2007). The limitations of this 
study were that the number of interviewees was small, the process was informal, the level of 
knowledge was unknown and the predictiveness of such a genetic test was not established.   
The other was a review of the use of genetic tests in the South African insurance industry 
(Kotze, Schoorn, & Coetzer, 2004).  The authors suggested that the fear of genetic 
discrimination in healthy individuals is unfounded.  Their reasoning was that predictive 
genetic tests were of value especially if preventative measures were available e.g. people 
diagnosed with specific factor V Leiden mutations could take suitable precautions to 
minimise the risk of clotting.  They concluded that there are only a few genetic disorders of 
relevance and that the LOA Code provides appropriate protection for the insured. 
In neither of these studies was the South African individual life insurance industry’s use of 
genetic tests explored.  The researcher felt that a study investigating the underwriting 
practices and the potential risks of ‘genetic discrimination’ or ‘anti-selection’ would be 
valuable and this was the reason this study was undertaken.  The results would provide 
insight into the effectiveness of current regulation and the protection afforded to the public 
and the insurance industry. This is important to assess as the LOA Code was modelled on 
international guidelines which may not be optimal for South Africa because of the unique 
insurance market due to its demographics. 
1.7 Aim 
The aim of this study was to investigate the South African life insurance industry’s response 
to the use of genetic tests in providing an individual life insurance policy, and to assess the 
associated risks of genetic discrimination and anti-selection. 
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1.7.1 Objectives 
The objectives of this study were: 
• To identify the insurance industry’s underwriting response to the use of genetic 
information, which encompasses genetic test results and family history, and non-genetic 
information, such as a personal medical history and health status. 
• To determine the effect of the use of such genetic information by the insurance industry 
on the underwriting decision.  
• To assess the insurers’ knowledge of the LOA Code of Conduct on Genetic Testing 
• To verify the authenticity of the reported underwriting approaches and decisions with 
regards to the use of genetic information, by comparing reported standard practices with 
the responses from hypothetical cases. 
• To investigate the effectiveness of the regulations in limiting adverse selection and 
genetic discrimination as a result of the insurance industry using genetic information. 
• If necessary to recommend changes to the underwriting process in response to genetic 
information and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the LOA Code of Conduct on 
Genetic Testing  
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Chapter 2: Materials and Methods 
  2.1  Introduction 
This study was a cross-sectional, comparative, descriptive analysis of the use of genetic 
tests by the life insurance industry of South Africa. Knowledge of genetic concepts and 
principles, underwriting practices (including underwriting requirements and decisions), 
insurance policy terms and conditions and alignment of company practices with industry 
regulations were investigated.    
The life insurance industry refers to life insurance companies, reinsurance companies and 
an industry regulator, the Ombudsman.  Reinsurance companies were included as they 
provide the life insurance company with financial protection for risk that the insurer is 
unable to cover.  Important to this study is that the reinsurers provide the life insurance 
industry with standards for underwriting practices and they are considered the ‘specialists’ 
within the life insurance industry 
Using a structured interview guide, data were collected by conducting interviews with 
participants from life insurance and reinsurance companies.   
  2.2  Setting of the study 
This was a national study and the interviews were conducted at the head offices of the 
respective companies or where the participants were situated.  Two interviews were 
conducted in Cape Town, eight in Johannesburg, one in Centurion and one in Pretoria. 
Data collection commenced in January 2009 and was finalised by May 2009.   
 
 27 
 
  2.3  Study process 
The design of the study was as follows: 
• Identification of the sample population of insurance and reinsurance companies, and a 
suitable participant from each of the respective companies 
• Obtain the approval of the company representative to participate in the research 
project 
• Conduct an interview with the participant using the interview guide 
• Computerise responses 
• Analyse data 
• Draw conclusions relevant to the aim of the study 
  2.4  Selection of the sample population 
The sample population for this study was defined as the life insurance industry of South 
Africa, incorporating life insurance companies, reinsurance companies and the regulatory 
bodies to the industry.  
  2.4.1  Selection of sample population - life insurance companies 
A list of registered South African life insurance companies was compiled from those listed 
on the Insurance Gateway website, a centralised web source of information relating to 
insurance in South Africa (Insurance Gateway Website, 2009) and the LOA website (LOA 
Website, 2007).  
Insurance companies included in this study had to meet the following criteria: they needed 
to be registered as a long-term insurance company; to provide private life insurance to 
individuals; and to provide life insurance benefits such as life cover, income disability and 
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critical illness.  The company had to perform their own underwriting (financial and 
medical) and be a member of ASISA (previously the LOA).   
Insurance companies were excluded if their business only provided funeral cover or group 
risk benefits because these are costed on the solidarity basis; accidental death or 
disability cover as these policies seldom require medical underwriting; and credit 
insurance as acquisition of this type of insurance is not voluntary.   
A list of all the insurance companies, their insurance benefits and the decision regarding 
eligibility for this study is summarised in Appendix A.  Ten out of 33 insurance companies 
met the inclusion criteria and were selected to participate in this study: 1LifeDirect, 
AltRisk, Assupol, Discovery Life, Liberty Life, Metropolitan Life, Momentum Life, Old 
Mutual, Professional Provident Fund (PPS) and Sanlam. 
 2.4.2  Selection of sample population - reinsurance companies 
In this study the reinsurance companies selected to participate were chosen for having 
provided support to individual life insurance companies in South Africa for more than five 
years.  These are General Reinsurance Africa (Pty) Ltd, Hannover Re Africa, MRoA 
Munich Re, RGA SA and Swiss Re SA. 
 2.4.3  The Long-term Insurance Ombudsman 
The regulatory body included in this study was the Long-term Insurance Ombudsman (the 
Ombudsman) because of his function as a mediator between the insurance industry and 
the consumer. Any complaints relating to adverse selection and genetic discrimination 
would be referred to the Ombudsman (Long term insurance ombudsman website, 2008).  
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  2.5  Construction of the instrument, information sheet and consent 
forms 
  2.5.1  Interview Guide 
The instrument for the interview was an interview guide, ‘Interview Guide for 
Insurer/Reinsurer’ (the interview guide), attached as Appendix B.  It was modelled on a 
schedule of questions used in a previous study with similar objectives, performed in the 
health insurance industry in the USA (Hall & Rich, 2000), The questionnaire was obtained 
directly from the authors.  
The interview guide was used to interview both insurance and reinsurance companies 
and adjusted to their business practices.  Responses from the reinsurance companies 
were not required for questions A2 and A3 as they do not provide benefits directly to the 
public.  Their business practices are structured on those of the insurance companies they 
insure. 
The interview guide consisted of three sections and the questions were constructed to 
meet the specific objectives of the study, namely: underwriting practices, compliance with 
industry regulations and underwriting behaviour in response to hypothetical case studies.  
The objectives for each section, and the information used to attain these goals, are 
detailed below:  
2.5.1.1  Section A: Underwriting Practices 
These questions were constructed to gain an understanding of a company’s 
underwriting practices, including their standard underwriting requirements and 
their underwriting response to the kind of underwriting information received for 
different benefit types, relating to a specific medical condition.   
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With a prior experience in insurance underwriting the researcher has the 
knowledge that the standard underwriting requirements are based on protocols 
that define what information is required from the applicant up front.  These 
requirements are based on the age of the applicant, the benefit type and the 
benefit amount requested and usually includes the application form, medical 
reports and blood tests.   
 
The different life insurance benefit types are life cover, income disability 
(comprising both a lump sum disability benefit and a monthly income benefit) and 
a severe illness benefit (also termed as a critical illness benefit). 
The medical conditions selected were based on their genetic pattern of 
inheritance.  This genetic mechanism played an important role in defining the 
relevance of genetic information for an insurer’s assessment of risk (as detailed in 
Table 1.1) (Harper, 1997).  The four medical conditions used were:  Huntington 
disease (HD), a late-onset neurodegenerative autosomal dominant disorder with 
100% penetrance; familial breast cancer (BrCa), an autosomal dominant disorder 
with variable penetrance; haemophilia (HP), an X-linked disorder that presents in 
childhood; and cardiovascular disease (CVD), a multifactorial condition.  
2.5.1.2  Section B: Compliance with regulations 
The questions in this section addressed the company’s level of understanding and 
compliance with the LOA Code (excluding the amendments to the LOA Code 
detailed in the ASISA Standard, as of April 2009). 
2.5.1.3  Section C: Underwriting behaviour of the company 
This section consisted of hypothetical cases constructed to assess the 
participant’s ability to apply the underwriting protocols, as detailed in Section A, to 
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practical cases.  The goal of this section was to determine the participant’s level of 
compliance to underwriting protocols in practice and their understanding of genetic 
disorders.   
Probing statements were used during the interview process.  The purpose and motivation 
for each question and the probing statements are detailed on the attached interview guide 
(Appendix B).   
2.5.1.4  Establishing that the interview guide is understandable 
The clarity of the questions and the length of time required to complete the interview 
process was discussed and approved by the researcher’s supervisors prior to 
commencing with the study.  No pilot was performed because of the small sample size. 
   2.5.2   Information Sheet 
The ‘Research Project Information Sheet’ was designed to provide the participants with 
details about the research project including the study aims, objectives and methodology, 
the criteria used to identify the participant as an eligible representative for the company, a 
brief description of the information and documentation required (copies of the company’s 
underwriting protocol and application form) from the participant and how confidentiality 
was achieved (Appendix C).  All selected insurance and reinsurance companies were 
assigned a unique numerical code for confidentiality.   
   2.5.3   Consent Forms 
Two consent forms were required for this project. The “Consent to Participate in an 
Interview” (Appendix D) form was the participants’ consent to participate in the research 
project and to an interview.  The “Recording Consent Form” (Appendix E) was for the 
participants to consent to a voice recording of the interview.  
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2.6  Procedure for data collection 
2.6.1 Invitation to participate in this research project 
The representatives from the companies were required to be individuals whose function 
involved the development, establishment and management of underwriting practices, who 
acted as facilitators in the underwriting process, especially for complex cases, and who 
had the authority to make decisions pertaining to ‘special’ underwriting cases.  These 
representatives included the company’s chief medical officer, specialist underwriters, chief 
underwriters and senior underwriters.  Representatives were identified based on these 
criteria, contacted telephonically and invited to participate in this research project.  
Representatives who had verbally agreed to consider participation in this study were 
provided with an electronic copy of the ‘Research project information sheet’ (Appendix C) 
and the ‘Consent to Participate in an Interview’ (Appendix D) forms.  Their agreement to 
an interview was confirmed on receipt of a signed copy of this form.  The representative 
was then contacted to make an appointment for the interview. 
2.6.2 Interview process and data collection 
To provide the participant of the company with an opportunity to prepare for the interview, 
a copy of the interview guide was forwarded at least one day prior to the appointment.  At 
the appointment, and prior to commencing with the interview, the participant was asked to 
consent to having the session audio recorded.  Consent was confirmed by signing the 
‘Recording Consent Form’ (Appendix E).  The interviews were conducted by the 
researcher using the interview guide, and the participants’ responses were documented 
and audio recorded.  On completion of the interviews, the participants were asked to 
provide a copy of the company’s underwriting protocols. For insurance companies, a copy 
of their application form, benefit definitions and description of the capital disability and 
critical illness benefit (CIB) were also requested.  The reasoning for the latter was 
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because the interview guide did not assess details about the benefits and their 
complexities.  Any differences in these definitions can directly impact underwriting 
practices, as the risk exposure to the insurer is defined by the life events that are covered 
under a specific product.  If required the application form may have been  used to verify 
the standard underwriting requirements and practices of the insurer. 
2.6.3 Obtaining information from the Long-term Insurance Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman was contacted to establish whether cases reporting genetic 
discrimination or adverse selection had been referred to him.  If such cases existed, their 
underwriting decision would need to have been made by using genetic information, 
including genetic test results, family history or a combination of family history and medical 
information.  The application date for these respective cases had to be after 1 January 
2002 as the LOA Code was only released in November 2001. The Ombudsman’s office 
referred the researcher to their website as all their cases are reportedly stored, detailed 
and are accessible from there. 
The Ombudsman website (http://www.ombud.co.za) has three sections that could 
potentially contain information detailing relevant cases, these were:  “Topics and Cases”, 
“Annual Reviews” and “Newsletters”.   
The “Topics and Cases” section (http://www.ombud.co.za/topicsandcases.asp last 
updated date unknown: accessed 08/06/2009) consisted of 25 topics.  Of these 25 topics 
only 12 were selected for all analysis as they had relevance to the theme of this study.  
These topics were: anti-selection (exclusions and non-disclosures), disability, dread 
disease, exceptions, exclusions and waiting periods, fairness, good faith, life policies, 
LOA, non-disclosure and pre-existing. These topics contained cases which were reviewed 
by the researcher to determine whether the resulting actions were as a consequence of 
non-disclosure or genetic discrimination relating to a family history or genetic information.   
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Annual reports from the Ombudsman’s office were reviewed for each year from 2003 to 
2008.  The reports were scanned using key words to identify cases that represent anti-
selection or genetic discrimination, these were: ‘non-disclosure’, ‘adverse selection’, ‘anti-
selection’, ‘discrimination’, ‘family’, ‘gene’ (which would highlight all words with gene as 
the root word) and ‘inherit’ (another root word).  The Ombudsman’s newsletters 
(http://www.ombud.co.za/newsletter.asp) were reviewed using the same search criteria.      
  2.7 Storage of data collected 
  2.7.1 Data storage using spreadsheets 
All consent forms are in hard copy and have been filed and stored according to the 
stipulations of the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical).  Data generated from 
the interviews, the application forms and the capital disability benefit and critical illness 
benefit definitions and descriptions were summarised and stored in a spreadsheet using 
Microsoft Excel®.   
  2.7.2 Storage of voice recordings 
The voice recordings were electronically downloaded and stored at the Division of Human 
Genetics, University of the Witwatersrand, using the Digital Voice Editor 2 programme.   
  2.8 Data analysis 
This research project is a cross-sectional comparative descriptive analysis with a small 
sample size (13).  The in-depth data from the interviews were not amenable to statistical 
quantitative methods of analysis, apart from sample totals and percentages.  The 
analysis, therefore, involved comparing responses from different companies and 
identifying areas of agreement and disagreement for various data sets.  The different data 
sets included responses to the questions in the interview guide from the insurers and 
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reinsurers.  In the interview guide a summary of the analysis performed for each question 
is detailed. 
 
For the purpose of this study the practices of the reinsurance companies are considered 
as the industry standard.  The results for the reinsurance companies were only reported 
on if the insurance companies’ practices did not align with that of the reinsurers’ i.e. the 
industry standard, or if the actions of the reinsurance companies needed to be considered 
because of the impact on the functioning of the industry.      
  2.9 Ethics approval 
Prior to commencing with the collection of data for this study an ethics application and 
research proposal were submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical) 
for research clearance.  Approval was obtained (protocol number M081038 dated 
12/12/2008) and the respective certificate is attached in Appendix F.   
The results and discussion of this research will be presented in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Results and Discussion 
This chapter provides a summary of the data gathered during the interviews with the 
participants of the insurance and reinsurance companies.   As the complete dataset 
obtained was too large to report on, the information was summarised and trends observed 
are reported.  The results have been structured to follow the underwriting process from 
application stage to the underwriting decision, and do not follow the order of the questions 
in the interview guide.  The specific questions that pertain to a section have been detailed.    
For reporting purposes the number of companies that align with a particular response will 
be expressed as the numerator of a fraction with the denominator being 8 for insurers, 5 
for the reinsurance companies and 13 for all participants.  The discussion regarding the 
interpretation and analysis of these results has been included in this chapter for 
continuity.      
 3.1  Participants in the study 
This section reports on the sample population, and establishes the eligibility of the 
participating companies and the level of homogeneity between them (questions A2 and 
A3 of the interview guide), to allow for optimal comparative analysis.     
 3.1.1 Study sample 
The study sample consisted of 13 of the 15 eligible companies invited to participate, 
which included 8 life insurance companies and all 5 reinsurance companies.  The 
participating life insurance companies were representative of the different company 
profiles related to the number of people they insure and the specialised products they 
provide. Of the 13 companies, 12 representatives were interviewed, and 1 reinsurance 
company provided written responses to the questions in the interview guide. 
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Two insurance companies declined to participate.  One is among the top three largest 
insurance companies in South Africa, and the other is a relatively new insurance company 
that provides insurance benefits through the internet.  Their participation would have been 
valuable as the larger company represents a large percentage of the insured population, 
and the new insurance company conducts their business in a unique manner (automated 
online application process) and it would have been useful to see the effect hereof on the 
underwriting process.   
3.1.2  Occupations of the representatives  
The positions held by the insurance company representatives interviewed included: 2 
specialist underwriters, 2 underwriting managers, 2 underwriting operation managers, a 
national underwriting manager and a chief medical officer (CMO).  For the reinsurance 
companies the participants included: 4 senior underwriters and a CMO. 
3.1.3  Summary of the interviews  
The interviews were conducted on the companies’ premises and the average duration 
was 1 hour.     
3.1.4 Confirmation of the eligibility and uniformity of life insurance benefits of the 
participants 
The eligibility of the participants and their comparative value was confirmed by identifying 
the products they provide and underwrite, and that these products were similar in their 
definition.   
All the insurance companies provided the benefits central to this study i.e. life cover, 
disability benefits (capital and monthly) and a critical illness benefit (CIB).   At application 
stage, all the companies performed underwriting for these benefits.  The reinsurance 
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companies do not have their own products but align their practices with the insurance 
companies they insure, and therefore align with the participating insurance companies.   
Differences that existed in the benefit definitions for the companies were identified by 
comparing their responses to question A3 of the interview guide to the benefit definitions 
and descriptions received from 7 of the 8 insurance companies.     
 
The benefit definitions were largely consistent.  Two major factors were identified that 
could influence the underwriting processes of the companies; these were the time period 
for the provision of the life insurance products and the type of CIB.  There are two options 
available for the time period that cover is provided.  One is whole of life, where cover is 
provided for the whole of the insured’s life or until benefit expiry age.  The other is a term 
policy, where the cover is provided for a defined period of time e.g. 10 years.  Only one 
insurer did not offer the latter option.   Concerning CIB, this benefit was classified into two 
types, the core CIB and comprehensive CIB.  The core CIB provides cover for four 
defined conditions; stroke, coronary artery bypass graph (CABG), heart attack and 
cancer.  Only 3/8 of the insurers offered this benefit.  The comprehensive CIB provides 
cover for predefined medical conditions for all body systems.  Differences noted for 
comprehensive CIB were in the conditions covered but these criteria are to be 
standardised across all the insurance companies by 1 September 2009 (ASISA, 2009a).  
The responses confirmed that the companies were similar for criteria important to this 
study, such as benefits provided, benefit definition and underwriting practices.     
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3.2 The South African insurance industry’s interpretation of genetic 
information  
 
This study evaluated the underwriting approach of the insurance industry in response to 
the use of a genetic test.  It was important to know the companies’ definition of a genetic 
test as this would directly influence their underwriting practices.  Based on this reasoning, 
it was of equal importance to establish the definition of a genetic condition, especially in 
relation to a genetic test.  As one author commented “a mutant gene is not a disease” 
(Godard et al., 2003).  The information used for this analysis was based on the responses 
to questions A1 and A6. 
 3.2.1 Definition of a genetic test 
For this study the relevant definition of a genetic test was that stipulated in the LOA Code, 
“The direct analysis of DNA, RNA or chromosomes for the purposes of determining 
inherited predisposition to a particular disease or group of diseases”(LOA, 2001).  Most of 
the companies’ (10/13) definitions aligned with this definition and the remaining three 
related their definition to a study of gene products as a predictor of disease.  This is not 
incorrect but for the purposes of this study their definition did not align with the LOA 
definition.  Therefore prior to commencing with the interviews these participants were 
asked to use the definition detailed in the LOA Code.   
 3.2.2 Definition of a genetic condition 
The participants were asked for their definition of a genetic condition to gain insight into 
their perception of the genetic disease processes and the value of a genetic test.    
For this study a genetic condition was referred to as a heritable medical condition caused 
by a change in the genetic information (DNA, RNA, chromosomes and other regulatory 
factors).  These conditions can be divided into two broad categories based on their 
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genetic inheritance, these are:  single-gene (monogenic) or multifactorial (Turnpenny, 
2005). 
The participants found it difficult to provide an exact definition for a genetic condition 
because of the many variables that exist.  Most of the participants defined a genetic 
condition as a heritable disorder (11/13), and considered them to be monogenic (4/13), 
multifactorial (4/13) or inclusive of both (5/13).  When asked to provide a list of the genetic 
conditions specifically detailed on their application forms, the common examples provided 
by the insurers were: diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, stroke, cystic fibrosis, 
liver disorders, polycystic kidney disease (PCKD), cancer, Alzheimer disease, porphyria, 
bleeding disorders and Huntington disease.   
From their examples the participants appeared to understand that many medical 
conditions have a genetic basis.  What was unknown was whether they understood that 
the genetic mechanisms of these conditions were not necessarily similar or fully 
elucidated.  It was not clear whether they understood that genetic tests are only available 
for a limited number of conditions, and the level of prediction offered is restricted to the 
depth of knowledge of the genetic basis.   
3.2.2.1 When a positive genetic test result denotes the presence of a 
genetic condition 
 
Due to the insurers’ interpretation of a genetic condition, it was important to determine 
what defines a genetic condition in relation to the presence of a positive genetic test.  At 
application stage the individual is required to disclose all relevant information to the 
insurer in order to assess their risk profile.  This includes any pre-existing medical 
conditions, which in the context of insurance, is any medical or physical condition that the 
applicant has suffered from, has known about, received treatment for or has consulted a 
medical specialist for in the past.  It was unknown under what circumstances the 
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companies’ considered a positive genetic test result to be a medical condition in the 
context of this definition.  This needed to be established because any misunderstandings 
could lead to perceived genetic discrimination or unintentional non-disclosure at 
application stage.  Question A8 required that the participants confirm in which of three 
situations, an individual with a positive genetic test, would be considered as having a pre-
existing condition. The results are detailed in Table 3.1.   
As expected, all the participants considered a symptomatic individual with a positive 
genetic test (A8.2) to have the genetic condition.  The responses for presymptomatic 
individuals were not as consistent. For an individual with a positive genetic test, who had 
received no treatment, 7/13 companies considered the condition to be pre-existing.  
Those that disagreed either considered it not to be pre-existing or were not certain but 
commented that they would base their decision on the predictability of the genetic test.  
The latter was a valuable comment as the greater the predictive value of the genetic test 
the greater the certainty that the individual will be affected by the condition.   
Table 3.1: Conditions that define a positive genetic test as a pre-existing condition 
 
Likewise, for an applicant with a positive genetic test who had undergone preventative 
treatment, most of the insurers (7/8) and reinsurers (3/5) considered this to be a pre-
existing condition, but one company was uncertain.  This uncertainty regarding when to 
Insurers Reinsurers Insurers Reinsurers Insurers Reinsurers Insurers Reinsurers
Question A8.1. Positive genetic test with no 
treatment or preventative management 5 2 2 1 1 1 1
Yes - BRCA or HD and No to 
CVD - predicatbility of test. 
Dependent on  inheritance 
pattern and penetrance
Question A8.2. Positive genetic test with 
treatment for the condition 8 5
Question A8.3. Positive genetic test with 
preventative management only 7 3 1 1 1
Pre-existing Condition
Conditions
Factors
Yes No EitherUnknown
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define a presymptomatic individual, with a positive genetic test as affected, increases the 
risk of non-disclosure and genetic discrimination.     
3.2.2.2 Required disclosure of genetic information at application for a 
life insurance policy 
 
The lack of consensus about when an asymptomatic individual was considered as having 
the condition raised concern, as an applicant may unknowingly withhold information that 
they do not think is relevant to their application, and this may be interpreted by the insurer 
as non-disclosure.  It was important to determine whether an applicant is afforded 
sufficient guidance and opportunity to disclose all information necessary.  Insurers were 
asked to provide a copy of their application form to assess whether the questions are 
constructed in such a manner that the individual would know to disclose that a genetic 
test had been performed.  Application forms were provided by 6 of the 8 insurers.  The 
questions in the application forms were assessed and the outcome was that the questions 
in the application forms prompted the applicant to disclose when a genetic test result is 
available.  It is therefore reasonable to consider that an applicant has knowingly withheld 
this information if they do not mention the availability of these tests.  
3.2.2.3  Risk of genetic discrimination for presymptomatic individuals 
 
A positive genetic test for an individual presymptomatic for a condition is a criterion used 
to detect genetic discrimination (Hall & Rich, 2000). Among the companies there was no 
consensus as to when a presymptomatic person with a positive genetic test is considered 
to have the condition.  This illustrates an increased risk for the insurer to act in a manner 
that may be perceived as discriminatory.  No distinction was made on the genetic basis of 
the condition, which can be predictive of the condition occurring (single gene disorders) 
but variable based on penetrance, or indicative of susceptibility only (multifactorial) 
(Godard et al., 2003).  These outcomes suggest that a risk for the establishment of a new 
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subclass of applicants, the “healthy ill”, exists (Bennett & Smith, 2007).  It was therefore of 
value to establish the underwriting practice of insurers in response to genetic tests to 
determine the effect on the individual’s ability to access cover.    
 3.3 Underwriting practices and protocols 
 
This section focuses on the initial phase of the underwriting process, when information to 
assist with risk assessment is requested by the insurer.  To determine whether insurers 
behave differently in response to genetic information versus non-genetic information, their 
standard underwriting requirements were established (using the responses to question 
A4).  These were then compared with the requirements needed in response to genetic 
information received (question A5).  Any differences between the underwriting 
requirements needed in response to genetic and non-genetic information that could not 
be demonstrated to be of actuarial relevance, could indentify an area of risk for genetic 
discrimination. 
3.3.1 Underwriting requirements in response to all types of information 
The standard underwriting requirements are the initial information received at application 
stage prior to the insurance company performing any evaluation of the applicant’s risk.  
For all the participating companies these requirements were the same and included a 
completed and signed application form, an HIV test and a cotinine test (for non-smokers).   
Most of the insurers (6/8) would request additional requirements in response to 
information received and the presence of relevant underwriting risk factors such as: 
benefit type, benefit amount, applicant’s medical history (as disclosed on the application 
form), family history and applicant’s age.  The relevance of these factors was defined by 
their relationship to a specific medical condition.  Additional requirements may include 
medical reports, medical examinations, questionnaires or additional pathology tests.   
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 3.3.2 Underwriting requirements in response to genetic information  
To establish the companies’ underwriting approach to genetic information, the companies 
were asked (question A5) to detail the additional underwriting requirements needed in 
response to a family history (FH) or a genetic test result (result not provided), for a 
medical condition, separately.  The conditions used were Huntington disease (HD), breast 
cancer (BrCa), haemophilia (HP) and cardiovascular disease (CVD).  Their response 
options included: no additional information, additional information, additional information 
based on risk factors, the risk factors used, and the type of additional information 
required.  A detailed summary of the underwriting practices for all the companies is 
provided in Appendix G.  These results were then assessed to determine if they differed 
from the standard underwriting protocols.    
3.3.2.1 Underwriting approach to a relevant family history for a 
medical condition 
 
The underwriting requirements in response to a FH of a medical condition were in keeping 
with the standard practices.  This was expected as the use of a FH is not new to the 
underwriting process.  Additional underwriting information was requested based on risk 
factors such as a relevant FH of the condition and the applicant’s age, medical history and 
state of health.  A family history where different members have been diagnosed with the 
same medical condition can be used to assess the risk of other family members being 
affected.    If this risk is deemed to be high, then in the context of insurance the individual 
is said to have a strong or relevant family history for the respective disease.  Criteria used 
to define a relevant family history included the relatedness of the affected individuals to 
the applicant and their age at diagnosis or death.   
 45 
 
3.3.2.1.1 Underwriting risk factors  
The criteria for the two main risk factors, relevant FH and age of the applicant, in relation 
to the examples of medical conditions used in this study have been summarised in Table 
3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Detail of the underwriting risk factors provided by the participating 
companies in response to medical conditions 
Medical 
condition 
Age of Applicant Family history 
Other Risk Factors 
Age 
Effect on 
requirements 
Relatedness 
Age of 
diagnosis/death of 
relative(s) 
Huntington 
Disease 
Greater than a 
defined age 
(45, 50 or 55 
years) 
Waive 
requirements 
- - - 
Breast Cancer > 50years 
Waive 
requirements 
>1 first degree 
relative (FDR) 
Less than a defined 
age (40, 50, 55, or 60 
years) 
Gender (males 
excluded by 2 
insurers); benefit type 
(CIB as it provides 
cover for cancer); 
prophylactic 
treatment 
Haemophilia 
(affected) 
- - - - Gender (males only) 
Cardiovascular 
disease 
Less than a 
defined age    
(30, 35, 40 or 
50 years) 
Reduce the 
stringency of 
requirements 
>1 relative 
Less than a defined 
age (45, 50, 55 or 60 
years) 
- 
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It was noted that there was little uniformity among the insurers in the criteria used to 
define the risk factors.  This was particularly evident when considering factors such as the 
age of the applicant and the age of diagnosis for family members relevant to a FH. 
For example, the age of the applicant affects the type of underwriting information required 
for HD.  If older than a specific age then the requirements are less onerous.  It is not clear 
how insurers determined at what age individuals are at a significantly reduced risk to 
develop HD, but for insurers this age ranges from 45 to 55 years.  It is assumed that this 
age is perceived to be the maximum age of risk for HD, and that the applicant is less likely 
to develop HD after this defined age.  This may be based on the fact that the average age 
of onset for HD has been described to be between 35 and 44 years.  However it is of 
significance that 25% of cases have an onset age over 50 years (Warby et al., 2007).   
Inconsistencies in the ages used to define relevant risk factors were also noted in the 
criteria for a strong FH, relating to the applicant’s current age and age of diagnosis of 
BrCa and CVD.  A FH of HD can be used to determine the potential age of onset in a 
presymptomatic individual yet FH risk factors are not considered for HD (Warby et al., 
2007). 
3.3.2.1.2 Additional underwriting information required in response to a 
relevant family history 
 
The additional information requested would be more onerous should the family history 
meet the criteria detailed in Table 3.2 and included a personal medical attendant’s report 
(PMA), medical report, medical examination and/or a questionnaire, and pathology tests, 
as per the standard underwriting requirements.  The purpose of these would be to obtain 
insight into the individual’s medical history and state of health.  Details of the 
requirements are provided in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 : Detail of the additional underwriting information requested in response 
to a family history 
 
Overall, the type of additional information requested was to obtain more information 
relating to the medical condition.  All the companies aligned with the LOA Code as they 
did not request that a genetic test be performed for underwriting purposes.  Many insurers 
refrained from enquiring directly whether a genetic test had been performed, and would 
trust that they would be informed thereof based on information detailed in the PMA.  
The underwriting response to a family history does not appear to prejudice the applicant 
as the standard requirements were applied.  The researcher feels that to reduce the risk 
of anti-selection, insurers should align their criteria for underwriting factors so that 
applicants will not be able to ‘shop-around’ for the most lenient approach.  This does not 
impact on their market competitiveness as this does not affect their product design.  The 
Medical condition 
Reason for requesting a 
PMA/Medical report/Medical 
examination/Questionnaire 
Pathology Test 
Huntington disease 
Determine whether genetic test 
performed 
Would not request that a genetic test be 
performed 
Breast cancer 
Obtain detail of cancer history 
and/or screening history e.g. 
mammograms 
Would not request that a genetic test be 
performed 
Haemophilia 
(Affected) 
Disease management, treatment 
and complications 
Would not request that a genetic test be 
performed. Request disease related tests; 
full blood count, partial thromoboplastin time, 
erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR) and /or 
clotting factors 
Cardiovascular 
disease 
Medical history and status; resting 
and effort electrocardiogram 
(ECG) 
Would not request that a genetic test be 
performed. Request disease related tests; 
cholesterol and/or glucose 
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opposite also applies in that by consolidating the definitions it will prevent insurers from 
interpreting the relevance of a family history differently which could prejudice the 
applicant. 
3.3.2.2  Underwriting approach to a genetic test result 
 
Although family history (FH) is a criterion not new to the underwriting process, the 
availability of a genetic test result is, and it was important for the researcher to assess 
whether the companies’ approach differed in response to this information.  These 
responses have been summarised in Figure 3.1.  
Please note: In reporting on haemophilia the response of two insurance companies were excluded as they 
had considered the applicant as unaffected, and no additional information was required  
Figure 3.5: Genetic test result: Underwriting response for specific medical 
conditions  
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In most instances, the additional underwriting requirements in response to a genetic test 
result were the same as that for a high risk FH.  The only difference to FH was when a 
copy of the genetic test result was requested.  The predictive value of a genetic test was 
expressed by the need for information in addition to the test result to make an 
underwriting decision.  
The insurers’ responses accurately reflected the predictive nature of the respective 
genetic tests and the importance of considering the inheritance pattern of the disease, as 
has been previously discussed in section 1.2.2, Pg.6.  All insurers considered the HD 
gene test to be the most predictive, and the gene test for BrCa less so, as they would 
require additional information for risk assessment.  It is known that the level of prediction 
differs between the HD and BrCa genetic test, based on penetrance as HD is fully 
penetrant whereas BrCa is not.  The positive result from a BrCa gene test confers a risk 
of 40% to 85% of developing breast cancer.  If the gene fault is unknown in the family, 
then a negative test does not alter the risk of BrCa making a relevant FH more important 
in risk assessment (Petrucelli, Daly, & Culver, 2007).  Thus additional information 
including detail of disease screening and prophylactic treatment was important to assess 
risk.   
The genetic test results for HP and CVD were shown to be of little value to the insurers, 
as additional information relating to symptoms of these diseases was more relevant for 
the assessment of risk.   The risk profile for an individual diagnosed with an early-onset 
condition such as HP was based predominantly on the severity of the condition and any 
related complications.  This was the same for a multifactorial condition such as CVD.  
Many genes have been identified which confer a susceptibility to CVD, but each with a 
very small contribution to risk and overall they do not equate to a high percentage of risk 
(Janssenns, Gwinn, Bradley, Oostra, van Duijn et al., 2008).  Therefore the standard tests 
and requirements relating to lifestyle and medical status are of greater predictive value.  
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This was summed up in a comment by one of the underwriters, who, with reference to the 
use of cholesterol tests and medical history for CVD risk assessment stated, “There isn’t 
an alternative available yet...for us the jury is still out (re genetic tests)...there isn’t 
statistical evidence...”.   
One insurer differed from the others in that all the genetic tests were considered to be 
predictive of risk, and stated that they would base their decision on this information alone.  
The reasoning was that individuals will access preventative care, should they test 
positive.  This demonstrates a poor insight into the genetic mechanisms of disease. 
In summary, the underwriting requirements in response to non-genetic and genetic 
information were similar, except when a highly predictive genetic test result was available.  
The value of the genetic test seemed to be based on the participants’ adequate 
understanding of the predictive value of the tests related to the inheritance of the genetic 
conditions.  However, one insurer did not share this understanding. 
3.3.2.3  Underwriting approach to a rare genetic condition  
 
The medical conditions used as examples in the interview guide, although rare, represent 
topics that are often encountered within the health profession, in the general press and 
the insurance industry.  It was important to determine whether the companies’ 
underwriting approach towards genetic information remained fair and consistent in 
response to an unknown genetic condition (Question A6.2).     
When asked for their response to an unknown genetic condition, the insurance 
companies all agreed that they would seek advice on how to proceed.  This included 
checking the reinsurance underwriting manual(s), referring to their senior underwriter, 
CMO and/or their reinsurance company.  Only a few CMO’s have genetic experience as 
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detailed in Appendix J.  Some mentioned that they would contact the pathologists or 
specialists who had made the diagnosis.   
Based on the responses from the insurers, it was evident that the reinsurance companies 
provide specialist support to the insurance industry.  Therefore details of whom they 
would contact for advice were considered.  The reinsurers’ responses were that they 
would consult with their CMO, their international offices and/or international specialists.  It 
is evident from these responses that the insurers are likely to respond to unique genetic 
information in an appropriate manner.    
The LOA Code and the ASISA Standard both confirm that they would provide support to 
the industry regarding the use of genetic tests for risk assessments, yet none of the 
insurers mentioned this option. 
 3.4 Underwriting decisions 
 
It has been demonstrated that the underwriting approach towards genetic information 
aligns with the standard practices of the insurance companies, except when the insurer 
has been informed that a predictive genetic test result is available (refer to section 3.3.2.2, 
Pg.48).  All these responses were also shown to conform to the guidelines as detailed in 
the LOA Code.  It was therefore important to establish how this genetic information was 
used to make an underwriting decision. The decision making process incorporates other 
factors that affect the applicant’s risk profile (age, occupation, health history), the benefit 
options selected and the benefit amount, in addition to the underwriting information 
received. 
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3.4.1 Underwriting decisions based on information received regarding a specific 
genetic condition 
In question A7, insurers and reinsurers were asked to provide their underwriting decision 
for a specific benefit, based on the type of underwriting information received for a medical 
condition.  The medical underwriting information included; genetic information, a family 
history (FH) and a positive genetic test (GT).  The non-genetic information included a 
medical history of the disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic) (MH) and a combination of 
both a family history and a medical history of the disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic) 
with no diagnosis in the application form (FHMH).  The examples of medical conditions 
used in the study were in keeping with those detailed in section 3.3.2.  The choice of 
underwriting decisions were: standard rates (SD), to increase or load the premium (load), 
to defer, to decline the benefit (decline), to apply an exclusion on the policy for the specific 
medical condition (exclusion) or to offer a term policy. Their responses were analysed to 
assess what effect the type of underwriting information received, the genetic condition or 
the benefit type had on the underwriting decision.   
The representatives sometimes provided more than one underwriting decision for each 
type of information received, because they had incorporated risk factors into their decision 
making process, such as those detailed in section 3.3.2.1.1. Therefore the total number of 
responses for each type of underwriting information received could exceed the number of 
companies participating, but the total for a specific underwriting decision would not 
exceed the total number of participating insurance (8) or reinsurance (5) companies. 
3.4.1.1  Underwriting decisions for a specific genetic condition 
 
For each medical condition, the insurance companies’ underwriting decisions were 
compared for each benefit type.   This provided insight into the impact that the information 
had on the decision which was based on the risk exposure for a particular benefit. The 
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results are discussed separately for each medical condition, and histograms (Figure 3.2, 
Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4., and Figure 3.5) summarise the results.  Appendix H provides the 
insurers detailed responses for each medical condition. 
3.4.1.1.1 Huntington disease 
Huntington disease is an autosomal dominant, late-onset neurodegenerative disease. 
There is a 50% chance for offspring from an affected parent to have inherited the 
mutation.  If the disease causing mutation is identified in an individual there is a 99.9% 
risk of developing the disease, showing virtually full penetrance.   The symptoms of this 
condition include progressive functional neurological impairment and mental disturbances 
including severe depression and personality changes (Warby et al., 2007).  Due to these 
symptoms, the likelihood that an affected individual would be eligible for a disability and/or 
CIB is high.  Death occurs within 15 to 20 years from onset of the symptoms, thus the age 
of mortality is dependent on when these symptoms first occur.  Due to the age of onset 
being variable, the presence of HD will only affect the standard mortality calculations 
should the age of onset be more than 15 to 20 years prior to average mortality age.  A 
summary of the insurers underwriting decisions for HD is detailed in Figure 3.2. and in 
Appendix H.1. 
For HD, the life cover benefit provided the greatest opportunity for an individual to access 
cover, for which the most favourable terms were afforded for when there was only a FH of 
HD and these were to load or offer a term policy.  For the other forms of underwriting 
information received, the common decision was to decline the life cover benefit, probably 
because the information provided was perceived to be more predictive of disease.   As 
expected, these decisions were influenced by risk factors such as the age of the 
applicant.  If the applicant was older than a defined age, the terms applied were more 
favourable, confirming the assumption of reduced risk for the insurer as discussed in 
section 3.3.2.1.1., Pg.45.  
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The favourable response to a FH for a life cover benefit was unusual as internationally the 
terms applied to a FH are to decline the benefit whereas for a GT the policy would be 
loaded or offered as a term policy, regardless of benefit or insurance type (Hall & Rich, 
2000; Bombard et al., 2009).  It is unknown why the results differ. It may be that these 
study results were in response to life cover only and perhaps the insurers are more willing 
to carry this risk compared to disability and CIB.   
 
Figure 3.2 : Insurers underwriting decisions for Huntington disease  
 
The standard underwriting decision for both the disability benefits and the comprehensive 
CIB was to decline cover, regardless of the type of underwriting information used.  When 
the applicant’s age was considered favourable then policy terms were applied - to load a 
disability benefit and apply an exclusion to the comprehensive CIB.  Standard rates were 
 55 
 
seldom offered, confirming that HD is viewed as a seriously debilitating illness.   The core 
CIB was declined except for in response to FH, even though this benefit does not provide 
cover for HD. 
The insurers’ response to a genetic test for HD confirmed its predictive value as decisions 
were defined by whether the result was positive or negative.  This is considered to be the 
correct approach provided that the testing was performed by a reputable genetic service, 
as there are criteria that will determine the testing procedure for the individual at risk.  
These include; confirmation of the disease in the family, the population group that the 
individual is from (determines which gene to test), the gene (there are two genes 
associated with Huntington-type disease i.e. HD1 and HDL2) and the mutation (the 
results vary in their level of prediction, such as the number of repeats noted in the HD 
gene) (Warby et al., 2007).    
An alternative to declining benefits was to offer a term policy.  Two of the 7 insurers 
provided this option, but for a life cover benefit only.  According to a participant from one 
of the reinsurers, the insurance companies in New Zealand may not decline cover based 
on a positive diagnosis of HD.  Therefore the alternatives they provide are to apply a 
loading or offer a term policy.   
The underwriting response to HD is in keeping with the disease process, its inheritance 
pattern and the predictive value of the genetic test. Thus people with a family history of 
HD would find it difficult to obtain life insurance in South Africa.  The insurers respond 
favourably to a negative HD genetic test result and the researcher feels that this may be 
viewed as coercion for an individual to be tested.   Alternate benefit options should be 
explored for individuals requiring financial protection, such as those reported for New 
Zealand.   
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3.4.1.1.2 Breast cancer 
Familial breast and ovarian cancer syndromes represent 5 to 10% of all breast cancers 
(Petrucelli et al., 2007).  The most common genes associated with these syndromes are 
BRCA1 and BRCA2.  Mutations found in either of these genes confer a risk of 40% to 
85% of breast cancer, hence penetrance is variable.  Importantly, these mutations also 
predict the risk of ovarian cancer with a risk which ranges from 10% to 60% (Evans, Kerr 
& Lalloo, 2006; Evans, 2006).  A negative genetic test in an individual from a family where 
the mutation in one of these genes has been identified, negates the individual’s  risk of 
hereditary cancer, yet a negative test in a family where the gene fault has not been 
identified does not.  A summary of the insurers underwriting decisions for BrCa is detailed 
in Figure 3.3. and Appendix H.2 
 
Figure 3.3 : Insurers underwriting decisions for breast cancer 
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The standard underwriting requirements played a major role in the decision making 
process for BrCa, and these included cancer history (regardless of whether the tumours 
were benign or malignant), results from screening tests such as mammograms, histology 
results from biopsies, prophylactic surgery, time of diagnosis, cancer treatment, period of 
remission and age of applicant.  Two of these, cancer screening and prophylactic 
treatment, align with the ASISA standard on genetic testing which stipulates that insurers 
should take this information into consideration when assessing risk (ASISA, 2009b) .  
Only one company requested information relating to prophylactic treatment.  
The insurance benefit with the most favourable terms for BrCa was the life cover benefit, 
where for all types of underwriting information, except GT, the benefit was offered at 
standard rates. This pattern was repeated for the disability benefits and CIB.  Terms were 
applied when risk factors like a relevant FH of BrCa existed, and as noted for HD, the 
disability benefits were loaded and an exclusion was applied to the CIB.   
In the process of making an underwriting decision most companies considered the results 
from a cancer screening test, such as a mammogram, but they did not appear to take 
note of the benefits of prophylactic surgery, as detailed in section 1.2.2, Pg.8.  A 
mastectomy was the prophylactic treatment considered by one insurer.  For this insurer, 
standard rates are offered for all benefits if the applicant has a GT, MH or a FHMH of 
BrCa, no history of cancer and has had prophylactic mastectomy.  If no prophylactic 
mastectomy was performed, then terms would be applied.   This protocol highlights the 
value of a FH when assessing risk and that these individuals would also benefit from 
prophylactic treatment (Petrucelli et al., 2007).  Thus the definition of a relevant family 
history is of utmost importance.  One of the underwriters even commented that 
“preventative measures are to her advantage” but interestingly this insurer’s underwriting 
practice does not consider prophylactic surgery. 
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An important observation is that none of the insurance companies considered the 
associated risk of ovarian cancer.  The researcher thought that the insurer that considers 
prophylactic mastectomy in their underwriting process may be vulnerable due to the 
unaccounted risk of the applicant developing ovarian cancer. 
The underwriting information that attracted the least favourable underwriting decision was 
a GT, suggesting that insurers’ believe that a GT is more predictive of risk than a FH, MH 
or FHMH.  This is an unexpected outcome compared to previous observations (section 
3.3.2.2) and the reasons for this are unknown.  The researcher feels that the 
consequence of these reported behaviours could result in an individual deferring genetic 
testing to obtain favourable terms for a policy based on FH only.   
3.4.1.1.3 Haemophilia 
HP is an early-onset X-linked condition (Turnpenny & Ellard, 2005).  A genetic test result 
for HP carries little value for risk assessment because the diagnosis is made on 
symptoms and the individual will be symptomatic.  The only information that affects the 
insurers’ decision process is the individual’s medical history.  A summary of the insurers 
underwriting decisions for HP is detailed in Figure 3.4. and Appendix H.3. 
The insurance companies responded with underwriting decisions that pertained to 
affected and unaffected individuals.  The responses relevant to this study were for 
individuals affected with HP, thus all the decisions were made by considering the 
standard risk factors, including the individual’s health status and complications associated 
with HP.   The life cover benefit was provided at standard rates if the affected individual 
was well managed and had no complications.  The terms applied for a personal disease 
history were to load or offer a term policy.  In response to other forms of underwriting 
information, the most common decision applied was first to load, and then less frequently 
to provide the benefit at standard rates or decline the policy based on the risk factors.  
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This pattern of underwriting decision-making was observed for both of the disability 
benefits and the comprehensive CIB.  The only difference was for the core CIB, where 
one insurer offered the benefits at standard rates and the other loaded the premiums. The 
reason for this varying response was unknown especially as the benefit does not provide 
for haemophilia. 
 
Figure 3.4 : Insurers underwriting decisions for Haemophilia 
 
The benefits that were relevant to an affected individual with HP were disability and CIB, 
as both provide cover for complications associated with HP such as functional impairment 
resulting from joint bleeds.   
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3.4.1.1.4 Cardiovascular disease  
CVD is a multifactorial disease where the predictive value of the genetic tests available is 
reported to be limited (Janssenns et al., 2008) and risk assessments are currently based 
on the medical status of the individual.  CVD is a common medical condition known to 
affect many South Africans, where in 2000, 16.6% of total deaths were attributed to CVD 
(Bradshaw, Groenewald, Laubscher, Nannan, Nojilana et al., 2003).  Therefore it is 
understandable that adverse terms are applied to all benefits should the risk of this 
disease exist.  A summary of the insurers underwriting decisions for CVD are detailed in 
Figure 3.5. Appendix H.4. 
 
Figure 3.5 : Insurers underwriting decisions for cardiovascular disease 
 
The decision making process in terms of CVD was founded on the underwriting risk 
factors such as the strength of the FH, the individual’s personal CVD risk factors such as 
the applicant’s age (greater than 45 years), medical history and health status at 
application stage i.e. cholesterol levels, ECG results, and behavioural risk factors e.g. 
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smoking status.  In response to a high risk profile for CVD the underwriting decision was 
either to load or decline the insurance policy based on severity.  The decisions were not 
affected by the type of information received nor the benefit type, but by the health status 
of the individual and the associated risk factors. 
3.4.1.2 Comparison of underwriting decisions for different types of life 
insurance benefits 
 
Differences in the most common underwriting decisions for each benefit type across the 
four medical conditions were identified and the outcomes are summarised in Table 3.4.  
All the trends of the underwriting decisions have not been discussed because of the 
influence of other factors in the decision making process as detailed in section 3.4.   
Regardless of the benefit type or the information received, the medical condition with the 
most adverse underwriting decisions was Huntington disease.  This confirms the insurers’ 
awareness of the associated debilitating symptoms of the disease and the high predictive 
value of the genetic test.  It also highlights that these individuals may not be able to 
access life insurance. 
The most favourable underwriting decision for all benefits and medical conditions was in 
response to a FH.  This was an unexpected outcome especially for a relevant FH, as one 
author commented “most high risks relevant to life insurance are revealed in family 
history” (Godard et al., 2003).  Therefore it is important that the criteria used to define a 
relevant FH are appropriate for the specific condition otherwise it may increase the risk of 
exposure of the insurer.  Likewise, because the criteria for a relevant FH were shown to 
differ for companies, that the chance of risk exposure for the insurer through the applicant 
‘shopping around’ for lenient underwriting was increased and it would therefore be 
beneficial if the criteria were uniform for all insurers.    
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Table 3.4: Common underwriting decisions for the different life insurance benefits 
for the different medical conditions 
 
Benefit Type 
Underwriting Information 
Received 
Common underwriting decision for 
specific medical condition 
HD BrCa HP CVD 
Life cover 
benefit 
Family history L SD SD L 
Positive Genetic Test D L L L 
Medical History D SD L L 
Family and Medical History D SD/L SD/L L 
Capital disability 
benefit 
Family history D SD SD L 
Positive Genetic Test D L L L 
Medical History D SD L L 
Family and Medical History D SD L L 
Income disability 
benefit 
Family history L/D SD SD L 
Positive Genetic Test D L L L 
Medical History D SD L L 
Family and Medical History D SD L L 
Comprehensive 
CIB 
Family history L/D E SD L 
Positive Genetic Test D E L L 
Medical History D E L L 
Family and Medical History D E L L 
Note: L – Load; D-Decline; SD-Standard rates; E – Exclude; HD – Huntington disease; 
BRCA – Breast cancer; HP – haemophilia; CVD – cardiovascular disease 
 
The underwriting responses are mostly appropriate for the information received but there 
are exceptions as described for FH e.g. breast cancer.  It was evident that the type of 
information received does affect the underwriting decision and, as previously noted, 
variables related to the presence of risk factors need to be taken into consideration 
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throughout the decision-making process.  The researcher suggests that these risk factors 
should be defined and consolidated in accordance with specialist knowledge available to 
protect the insurers.  Currently, these definitions are not consistent across the companies. 
3.4.2 Reconsideration of an adverse underwriting decision in response to a 
negative genetic test result 
A large portion of this study focused on the underwriting response to a positive genetic 
test.  Of equal importance was to determine the underwriting decision in response to a 
negative genetic test, especially after an adverse underwriting decision had been made 
(question A10). The responses would also confirm the companies’ perception of the 
predictive value of the genetic test.  Their responses are summarised in Table 3.5    
Table 3.5: Insurance and reinsurance companies underwriting responses to 
negative genetic test results 
 
All of the participants agreed that they would reassess any previous adverse underwriting 
decision on receipt of a negative genetic test, provided that the predictive value of the 
genetic test was informative.   
 This response aligns with a clause in the ASISA Standard on Genetic Testing which 
states that “The applicant may ask the insurer to review any adverse underwriting 
decision based on a relevant predictive genetic test result” (ASISA, 2009b) and that the 
Insurer Reinsurer Insurer Reinsurer
HD 8 5 7/8 insurers and 5/5 reinsurers would apply standard rates 1
BRCA 8 5
7/8 insurers and 5/5 reinsurers would 
apply standard rates.  However one 
reinsurer commented that if the family 
history is strong they would load the 
policy
1
CVD 2 8 3
Rate according to other factors such as 
ECG, cholesterol.  One reinsurer would 
consider the genetic test results but in 
conjunction with standard medical 
information
Decision 
UnknownUnderwriting DecisionCondition
Adjust Underwriting Decision
Yes No
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individuals are not granted premiums that are less than the standard rate (LOA, 2001; 
ASISA, 2009b). 
Of interest, was the interpretation of the predictive value of the genetic test.  The 
interpretation of the HD genetic tests was the same as previously noted.  However, the 
BrCa test was incorrectly considered as highly predictive as many insurers would make a 
decision without considering other risk factors.  This indicates that the insurers do not 
understand that a negative genetic test for BrCa does not necessarily reduce the risk of 
BrCa where a family mutation has not been identified.  In these circumstances other risk 
factors, such as the relevance of the FH, should still be considered.  Many insurers and 
reinsurers would not use a CVD genetic test, and this would be appropriate because 
these genetic tests are of little predictive value.  However one reinsurer commented that 
they would use the genetic test result to finalise a decision, thus alluding to a belief that 
this test has high predictive value.   
This variance in the interpretation of the predictive value of a genetic test is concerning, 
as the risk assessment is directly affected by the level of prediction afforded by the test.  
The value of a genetic test is also influenced by other factors such as the population 
group of the applicant, the gene analysed for the disease causing mutations, the 
association of this gene with the respective medical condition, the fault detected by the 
gene analysis, the interpretation thereof and the availability of the tests (Godard et al., 
2003). These factors are not taken into consideration by the insurers. 
When evaluating the use of a genetic test for the purpose of insurance underwriting it is 
important to consider the above factors.  The role of ASISA is to obtain information 
relating to the validity of the tests being used and to have a list of those that should not be 
used (ASISA, 2009b).  The researcher contacted ASISA and requested details of the 
criteria used by them to evaluate the tests and for the respective list of these tests.   Their 
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response was that the information was not available.  It is therefore unknown what criteria 
are used to assess the value of a genetic test for the industry, what tests are considered 
useful and which ones should not be used.   
The researcher thinks that it would be valuable for the insurance industry to have 
specialist advisors to interpret these test results, because of their complexities, and that 
the value of genetic services in this process should not be underestimated. 
3.5 Underwriting behaviour in response to hypothetical case studies 
 
The participants were provided with hypothetical case studies (section C) for three 
medical conditions, HD, BrCa and CVD.  Each case had questions relating to the 
underwriting practices of the company as established through section A of the interview 
guide). The companies’ responses were then reviewed to assess their underwriting 
behaviour in comparison with their standard protocols and theoretical underwriting 
decisions (as summarised in section 3.4).  These questions also provided insight into the 
insurers’ knowledge of the medical condition and the genetic information, and their ability 
to apply this to the case.  Their responses have been summarised in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 
3.8, and the number of companies’ whose responses align with their specific underwriting 
protocol is expressed as a fraction.   
 3.5.1  Hypothetical case study I: Huntington disease 
For details of this case study please refer to hypothetical case I in the interview guide 
(Appendix B).  This case study was regarding two brothers, both over the age of 30 
years.  They were both applying for life insurance benefits.  Their father had been 
diagnosed with HD at the age of 55 years and the one brother had a medical history of 
tremors and memory loss that his doctor ascribed to stress.  The responses to questions 
1 to 9 relating to this case are detailed in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Results from hypothetical case study I: Huntington disease 
Question 
Align with the 
company’s standard 
protocol 
Detail of response Other 
 
Q1. Additional 
requirements FH of 
HD 
7/8 and 4/5 
PMA 
Availability of HD genetic 
test result 
None requested genetic 
test 
Q6. Additional 
requirements FHMH 
7/8 and 5/5 
Information regarding  
symptoms (tremors, 
memory loss and stress) 
1/8 previously required 
additional information, but 
now base decision on 
FHMH and decline 
Q2. Underwriting 
decision FH of HD 
6/8 and 3/5 
 
Decline or apply a term 
policy 
Changes to decision - 
favourable to applicant 
Q7. Underwriting 
decision FHMH of HD 
6/8 and 2/5 Decline or defer 
An alternate option to 
decline was to defer or 
offer terms (3/8) 
Q4. & Q8.  
Underwriting decision 
positive genetic test 
with FH or FHMH of 
HD 
8/8 and 5/5 
Decline(6/8 and 5/5)/Load 
(1/8)/Exclude (1/8) 
Alternate option (2/8 and 
1/5) was to offer a term 
policy 
Q5. Underwriting 
decision negative 
genetic test FH of  HD 
 
8/8 and 5/5 Standard rates except 1/8 
1/8 now load for FH, 
previously would have 
offered standard rates 
Q9. Underwriting 
decision negative test 
FHMH of HD 
8/8 and 3/5 Terms for symptoms 2/5 offer standard rates 
Q3.  Adoption - - 
All would disregard FH.  
1/5 would not comment 
as an ‘ethical’ issue. 
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The responses from the insurance and reinsurance companies generally aligned with 
their standard underwriting practices.  The medical status of the individual played an 
important role as is evident in the different response to questions 6, 7 and 9 for the 
brother displaying symptoms compared with questions 1,2 and 5 (see Table 3.6). 
Changes to the standard underwriting decision were to the advantage of the client, but the 
motivation for these was unknown.   
The known predictive value of a HD genetic test was confirmed and expressed by all 
companies declining cover for a positive test and most offering standard rates for a 
negative test for the asymptomatic brother.  For the brother with symptoms the response 
was to rate the symptoms, even if a negative genetic test existed.   
A risk of genetic determinism (section 1.4.1, Pg.13) , or even discrimination was identified 
in the responses of two reinsurers, who would offer the applicant cover at standard rates 
because the test was negative i.e. inferring that if the genetic status is normal then the 
symptoms are inconsequential.    The researcher feels that although the test proves that 
the symptoms are not as a result of HD, these symptoms and their cause should still be 
investigated because of the impact of these on the individual’s risk profile. 
One insurer stated that they would apply a loading for a FH even though the genetic test 
was negative.  This suggests a limited understanding of the inheritance pattern for HD 
and for the ability to convert the definitive genetic test result into a risk.     
All insurers appeared to understand that HD is a heritable condition as they would 
disregard the FH of HD if the applicant was adopted.   The only difference was a 
comment from a reinsurer who stated that this is an ‘ethical’ issue.  Unfortunately they did 
not provide further insight into their thought process.   
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It can be concluded from this case that the behaviour of the companies aligned with their 
protocols, and applicants could be reassured that they would be treated in accordance 
with the stipulated processes for HD.    
Based on their responses, individuals’ with a positive family history for HD are unlikely to 
be able to access life insurance cover, especially disability and CIB.  The benefit 
application would either be deferred until a predictive genetic test result is available, or 
declined.  Applicants over a defined age, such as 45 years, may access insurance cover 
and policy terms will be applied such as a premium loading or an exclusion.  In response 
to a positive genetic test result, most insurers will decline access to cover.  Favourable 
alternate options may be provided dependent on the applicant’s age, but the cover will be 
provided as a term policy or with a loading.  Overall the insurers will provide insurance 
cover at standard rates to individuals with a negative HD genetic test result.   
The participants’ depth of understanding relating to HD was of interest, as it is a rare 
disorder, and one underwriter stated that in the 36 years he had been in the industry he 
had only been exposed to two cases of HD.  Their decision making process for other 
more common but more complex conditions was less aligned among the insurers. This 
suggests that their knowledge is based on guidelines specifically developed for HD and 
not on an understanding of the genetic disease mechanism for HD.  Therefore it would be 
valuable to ensure that an understanding of the inheritance pattern and interpretation of 
genetic test results for HD exists, through appropriate training or detail in the underwriting 
manuals, to provide the insurers with a greater understanding and ability to interpret 
genetic information received.   
 3.5.2  Hypothetical case study II: Breast cancer 
For the details of this case study please refer to hypothetical case II in the interview 
guide (Appendix B).  This case was of a 35 year old woman applying for life insurance 
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with a relevant family history of breast and ovarian cancer.  At application stage she 
informed the insurer that she had performed cancer screening tests i.e. mammograms, 
and a BRCA1 test.  The questions were structured to assess the insurers knowledge of 
the association between ovarian and breast cancer in terms of hereditary cancer 
syndromes.  Their detailed understanding of the genetic mechanisms was assessed 
through the inclusion of both the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in the case, and the value of 
having identified the mutation within the family.  The responses to questions 1 to 5 
relating to this case are detailed in Table 3.7. 
In general, the underwriting responses for this case study indicate that the insurance 
companies would align with their standard practices, and any differences were to the 
advantage of the client as they would not hastily provide a decision, but rather wait for all 
relevant information before assessing the risk.   
Their decision making process became less certain when the information received was 
more complex.  Two of the questions specifically mentioned the genes associated with 
the familial breast and ovarian cancer syndrome, BRCA1 and BRCA2.  The information 
provided was that the individual had a negative BRCA1 test with a family history of 
BRCA2 gene mutation.  Therefore a BRCA1 test would not be informative for this family.  
Instead of standard responses, most of the participants were uncertain as how to 
proceed.   Almost half of the companies (6/13) made the correct assumption which was to 
base their requirements and decision on the FHMH and not on the genetic test result. 
However, of concern is that some (3/13) were prepared to provide an underwriting 
decision based on the negative BRCA1 test.  Only two (2/13) responded by stating their 
uncertainty as how to proceed.      
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Table 3.7: Results from hypothetical case study II: Breast cancer 
 
Only one insurer made reference to the risk of ovarian cancer and requested detail of 
cancer screening tests performed, specifically a pap smear.  The current standard 
Question 
Align with the 
company’s standard 
protocols 
Detail of response Other 
 
Q1. Underwriting 
requirements FH and 
test result for BrCa 
8/8 and 5/5 
PMA, mammogram 
results; BRCA1 results 
1/8 investigated risk of 
ovarian cancer i.e. pap 
smears 
Q2. Underwriting 
decision FH and test 
result for BrCa 
Capital Disability: 5/8 and 
5/5 
Critical Illness Benefit: 5/8 
and 5/5 
Dependent on risk 
factors e.g. cancer 
history, mammogram 
results, relevance of FH, 
prophylactic treatment, 
age of applicant.  
Common underwriting 
decisions; load disability 
and apply an exclusion 
to CIB  
Changes to decision - 
favourable to applicant. 
3/8 deferred awaiting test 
result; 1/8 considered  
prophylactic treatment  
Q3. Underwriting 
decision BRCA1 
positive 
4/8 and 3/5 
Standard rates/ Load / 
Exclude / Decline  
Most decisions based on 
mammogram results and 
medical history.  Changes 
to decisions – not 
favourable  
 
Q4. Additional 
underwriting 
requirements BRCA1 
negative in BRCA2 
positive family 
No specific standard 
requirements but 
compared responses with 
Q1., responses to a FH 
with genetic test result 
available (4/8 and 2/5) 
Other responses: Did 
not know what to do 
(2/8); Defer until BRCA2 
test result available(2/8); 
1/5 discuss the issue 
with their CMO and 2/5 
use the negative BRCA1 
result 
1/8 required an up to date 
BRCA1 test if the 
previous test was 
performed more than 2 
years prior 
 71 
 
screening tests using pap smears or cancer biomarkers such as CA125 have a limited 
screening efficacy and therefore are not optimal for defining risk (Evans, 2006). 
These responses highlight a poor knowledge into the detailed genetics relating to 
inherited breast cancer, as does the comment from one insurer requiring an ‘up-to date’ 
genetic test.  Of concern was that many of the companies would offer a decision without a 
good understanding of the information received.  Based on their responses to question 4, 
the insurers also used the genetic testing information of other family members which the 
LOA Code specifically prohibits.  In this case study it is unknown how the company was 
informed thereof and it could be argued that this information was provided with the 
consent of the other family members.  
The inheritance of BrCa is complex and the assignment of risk even more complicated.  
As hereditary breast and ovarian cancer represent a small percentage of BrCa cases it is 
possibly unreasonable to expect the insurers to have this knowledge, although it does 
identify the importance and value of referral of such cases to appropriate specialists. 
 3.5.3  Hypothetical case study III: Cardiovascular disease 
For the details of this case study please refer to hypothetical case III in the interview guide 
in Appendix B.  This case study used a multifactorial condition which was selected to 
ascertain the insurers understanding of the predictive value of a genetic test for this type 
of condition.  This was important because these tests are known to have little value in 
interpretation of risk but are available commercially.  Therefore the possibility exists that 
an applicant may provide this information and it is valuable to determine the insurers’ 
response to this type of information.  The responses to questions 1 and 2 are detailed in 
Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.8: Results from Hypothetical Case study III: Cardiovascular disease 
Question Align with standards Other 
Q1. Underwriting 
requirements CVD FH 
and genetic test profile 
8/8 and 2/5 requirements 
as for a FH 
2/8 and 1/5 genetic test 
results 
1/5 no longer required a 
genetic test result which 
was their standard; 2/5 
would get CMO to interpret 
Q2. Underwriting 
decision CVD FH and 
genetic test profile 
8/8 and 4/5 decision based 
on medical information;  1/5 
decision based on medical 
information and genetic test 
1/5 stated if medical history 
leads to a borderline 
decision, use genetic test 
to force a decision 
 
The responses to this case study relating to CVD were in agreement with the standard 
protocols for the various companies.  The feedback showed that none of the companies 
were aware that these types of tests are currently available from a limited number of 
private companies.  The overall outcome indicated that fewer companies required the 
results of the genetic test, confirming the previous observation that these tests are, 
correctly, not considered as having a predictive value.   
One reinsurer said they would consider this information as relevant in extreme situations, 
but these were not defined.  This response raises concern about the company’s 
understanding of the predictive value of the test.  Thus creating doubt as to whether there 
is a means to define whether a predictive test is of value or not in assisting the reinsurer 
to assess risk.   
The insurers were not aware of the availability of the genetic tests that are marketed to 
the general consumers.  A basic awareness and understanding of the value of these tests 
to the insurance industry for risk assessment purposes should exist and be provided in 
training.  It is important to have access to this type of information and to the appropriate 
specialists to interpret the predictive value of a test for risk assessment. 
 
 73 
 
 3.5.4  Summary of the underwriting approaches to hypothetical cases 
Overall the hypothetical cases illustrated that in practice, the insurers and reinsurers 
would, in most instances, apply their standard underwriting protocols.  Some concerns 
arose when subtleties relating to the genetic conditions were introduced, and the 
responses seemed to indicate a poor detailed understanding.  This highlights the 
importance of introducing training to increase knowledge with regards to genetic 
conditions and the interpretation of genetic information.  It also indicates the importance of 
being able to access expert advice or refer complex cases to the appropriate specialists. 
This would ensure that the insurers will be able to make decisions on specialist advice 
and allow for optimal risk analysis whilst reducing the opportunity for discrimination. 
3.6 Cases of genetic discrimination and anti-selection based on 
genetic information  
 
As one of the objectives of this study was to investigate the risk of genetic discrimination 
and adverse selection, the existence of these phenomena in the context of genetic 
information was explored.  
3.6.1 Identification of cases by the insurers/reinsurers of anti-selection based on 
genetic information 
The companies were requested (question A9) to provide examples of cases where  anti-
selection was identified to be due to the non-disclosure of a genetic condition based on a 
family history, a genetic test, a medical history or a combination of these.  Of the 
insurance companies only 5 of the 8 had analysed their records for such cases, but only 
two could provide details of relevant cases.   
Regarding the specific cases reported, one insurer reported a claim for kidney disease, 
where the doctor’s report for the claim revealed a strong medical history of polycystic 
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kidney disease which was not disclosed at application stage.  The premium for this policy 
was loaded retrospectively.  The other was a claim for breast cancer for which the insured 
claimed within 8 months from the date that the cover commenced.   The claims 
investigation revealed a strong family history, which had not previously been disclosed.  
They paid the claim but applied a loading to the relevant benefit for the strong family 
history. 
Only one reinsurance company knew of a case relating to cardiovascular disease where 
the individual had not disclosed a strong family history.  Another reinsurer made a 
comment that they were of the opinion that non-disclosure was occurring, particularly in 
the realm of breast cancer.  Their explanation was that the most common condition 
claimed for soon after policy inception was breast cancer and that in their experience it 
accounts for 70% of CIB claims.  These comments are of interest but do not confirm non-
disclosure of genetic information as only a small percentage of breast cancer cases are 
due to an inherited breast and ovarian cancer syndrome.   
Although the fear of adverse selection exists, only three cases were reported by the 
companies.  This leads to the question whether non-disclosure of genetic information 
does exist or is it just not identified? The practices of the insurance companies suggest 
that it is unlikely that a large number of cases would be missed because of the 
comprehensive application process. 
3.6.2 Cases referred to the Long-term Insurance Ombudsman for anti-selection or 
genetic discrimination 
No cases were identified that had been referred to the Ombudsman’s office specifically for 
non-disclosure or genetic discrimination.  Of interest was a section in their Annual Reports 
that details the number of cases referred to the Ombudsman resulting from non-
disclosure, not just based on genetic information, and what percentage of these cases 
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were ruled in favour of the insured i.e. cases where the insurer’s actions had been shown 
to be incorrect. A summary of these findings is detailed in Appendix I. 
From 2003 to 2008 the number of cases reported to the Ombudsman for non-disclosure 
of all types of information had steadily reduced, perhaps indicating that applicants are 
more aware of the information to be disclosed at application stage and implications of 
non-disclosure.  The percentage of cases where the Ombudsman’s ruling favoured the 
insured varied over the years, but remained consistent at about a quarter of cases 
referred. Although contradictory to the previous observation, this could be due to a 
discrepancy in what insurers and the Ombudsman consider as useful information to 
assess the applicant’s risk profile.   
 3.7 Compliance with the LOA Code of Conduct: Genetic Testing 
 
The companies’ compliance with the LOA Code was evaluated throughout the interview 
process and these have been reported on.  Section B of the interview guide specifically 
focused on the companies’ compliance with the administrative practices and functions 
stipulated in these guidelines. The LOA Code defines the role of the underwriter and the 
CMO in the process of accessing genetic tests, and hence compliance to these roles was 
investigated, in particular, the role of the CMO, which included the provision of training 
regarding genetics, advice on complex cases regarding a genetic condition and network 
with medical professionals.   The outcomes are summarised in Appendix J. 
In general, the companies align with the guidelines of the LOA Code.  Although none has 
a specific genetic underwriter, they would refer genetic cases to their senior underwriter or 
their CMO, as confirmed in Section 3.3.2.3., Pg 50.   The role of the CMO was 
established and includes provision of training in genetics and access to genetic specialists 
for their expertise.    Although the CMOs are highly specialised, only one was a medical 
geneticist.  This is a reasonable outcome as the use of genetic information in the 
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insurance industry forms a small sector of their responsibilities.  Most companies rely on 
the reinsurance companies for training in genetics and their only exposure has been 
information provided in the standard underwriting training courses.  
Cases where a genetic test result is available can be referred to the Medical and 
Underwriting Standard Committee of ASISA, but none of the companies made this 
comment.  These responses identify the importance of the insurance industry being able 
to access medical specialists in the field of genetics for specialist support.  The 
researcher suggests that specialist training should be provided to increase the basic 
understanding and interpretation of genetic principles for the use of this information in the 
context of life insurance. 
The next chapter provides the conclusion drawn from this study with recommendations 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
This study is the first in South Africa to report on the appropriateness of the underwriting 
approach to the use of genetic tests by the life insurance industry of South Africa.  Another 
aim of this study was to identify behaviours that could lead to genetic discrimination or an 
increased risk for anti- selection. 
Genetic test results may be accessed and used by the life insurance industry of South Africa 
for risk assessment in accordance with the principles of the LOA Code on Genetic Testing 
(now the ASISA Standard) (LOA, 2001; ASISA, 2009b).  The insurance industry’s response 
to the use of genetic tests was evaluated by following and assessing the underwriting 
procedure from the application stage to the underwriting decision and their compliance with 
these guidelines 
 4.1 Underwriting approach to genetic and non-genetic information 
From this study, the researcher demonstrated that the insurance industry’s underwriting 
approach to information relating to a genetic condition was generally aligned with their 
standard underwriting practices.  Any change to this practice was based on the availability 
of an appropriate genetic test result.  The use of these tests was generally based on the 
predictive value in relation to the medical condition and the presence of the symptoms.   
4.1.1 Impact of the inheritance pattern on the underwriting approach  
Haemophilia, an early-onset condition, and cardiovascular disease a multifactorial condition 
were two of the four examples of genetic conditions used in this study.  For both these 
conditions there was little value in the use of a genetic test, because the presence of the 
disease symptoms or indicators, and the severity of the complications associated with the 
disease were more indicative of risk.  This fact was recognised by the majority of insurers and 
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therefore the underwriting procedure for these conditions was consistently and appropriately 
determined by the analysis of the individual’s health status.  
 
This differed for the other two medical conditions used, breast cancer and Huntington 
disease, which for this study represented late-onset autosomal dominant conditions, one with 
full penetrance and the other with reduced or variable penetrance.   Information valuable for 
risk assessment would be needed to predict the occurrence of these disorders in a 
presymptomatic individual, and would include genetic test results, a strong family history or a 
disease screening test.  The information used was based on the level of predictability it 
afforded.  Inconsistencies were noted in the insurers’ perceived value of the information and 
the interpretation thereof, particularly when considering the underwriting responses to breast 
cancer. 
4.1.2 Impact of a family history on the prediction of risk for underwriting 
It was shown that on notification of a family history or a genetic test result for a medical 
condition, the insurers’ response was generally to request additional information (see 
Appendix G).  The type of information required was defined by the presence of risk factors 
associated with the condition, in particular the age of the applicant and the presence of a 
strong family history.    
 4.1.2.1  Age of the applicant as an underwriting risk factor 
The age of the individual was used to classify the applicant into a high or low risk category for 
the specific disease.  For Huntington disease, less information was required to assess an 
individual’s risk of developing this disorder if they were older than a defined age.  This age 
differed from 45 to 55 years between insurers.  Presumably, the rationale behind this ruling is 
that the average age of onset for Huntington disease is 33 to 45 years, but importantly 25% 
of affected individuals will start their symptoms after the age of 50. This difference in the 
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definition of risk factors was again demonstrated for cardiovascular disease where the age 
used for risk assessment ranged from 30 to 50 years.   
 
The researcher is concerned that the Insurers may still be exposed to an increased risk even 
by applying these underwriting standards.  This is because inconsistencies in the definitions 
of these risk factors exist between companies and not all available information was used to 
define the standards.   With the differing definitions, applicants have the opportunity to select 
an insurance company with the most favourable underwriting practices and may gain access 
to cover with no further investigations.  Where another company may have assessed them 
further and identified an increased risk.  Therefore the age of the applicant relevant to risk, 
needs to be consolidated between companies. For HD, this risk can be reduced by 
considering the family history.  Although not definitive it can predict the expected age of onset 
for an applicant and thus the subsequent risk exposure to the insurer.  The researcher feels 
that each case will require individual assessment and consultation with genetic specialists. 
4.1.2.2  Relevant family history as an underwriting risk factor 
A relevant family history was used by the insurance companies to predict the risk of the 
applicant developing the disorder and they used variables to define what constitutes a 
‘relevant’ family history.  These variables differed between the companies for breast cancer 
and cardiovascular disease and were not defined for a family history of Huntington disease.  
A relevant family history of breast cancer was defined by the insurers as a family where more 
than one first degree relative was diagnosed with breast cancer below a certain age. This age 
differed between companies and ranged from 40 to 60 years.  The inconsistency in the 
relevant age of diagnosis was also observed in the variables that define a relevant family 
history of cardiovascular disease.  It is unclear to the researcher why a relevant family history 
of Huntington disease has not been defined or even considered.  This information, when 
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used in conjunction with the age of the applicant, would be useful to the insurer to assess the 
individual’s risk in terms of age of onset, as detailed in section 4.1.2.1.  
 
The insurers’ perception of the predictive value of a ‘relevant’ family history also seemed to 
vary.  Initially, they stated that they would not make an underwriting decision on family history 
alone, but would require additional information, suggesting that a family history alone is not 
predictive of risk.  However, in a separate section, when asked their underwriting response to 
a relevant family history, they did so without needing additional information, inferring that a 
family history alone was predictive of risk.  Another illustration of their uncertainty of the 
predictive value of a family history, is that the terms applied to a policy for a family history 
were more favourable compared to those in response to other forms of underwriting 
information, such as a genetic test or a medical history.  The researcher felt that this could 
suggest that a family history is considered by the insurance companies to be more predictive 
of risk than another form of information.  This may not always be accurate as it will be 
determined by the genetic mechanisms of the medical condition, such as inheritance and 
penetrance, as well as the criteria used to define a relevant family history. 
 
The possible outcome of these observations is that by having different definitions for a 
relevant family history an applicant may choose a company with the least stringent 
underwriting terms and this could lead to insurance companies being exposed to unexpected 
risk.  Likewise the applicant is at risk of being treated differently by the same insurer or 
another insurer because of their varying interpretation of a relevant family history, and the 
researcher suggests that this may be a form of discrimination.  This identifies the need to 
standardise these definitions. 
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4.1.3 Impact of a genetic test on the prediction of risk for underwriting 
When insurers are notified that a genetic test result is available their underwriting response is 
to request the same standard information as that required to assess a family history.  The 
genetic test result is only required if the test is considered of high value in predicting the 
occurrence of the disease. 
 
The need for information in addition to the genetic test result to make an underwriting 
decision is indicative of the predictive value of the test.  In this study the insurers’ responses 
to the Huntington disease genetic test was consistent, and reflected the fact that the 
presence of the genetic mutation in this condition is virtually 100% predictive of disease in a 
presymptomatic individual.   
 
The researcher found that the insurers’ responses to a genetic test for breast cancer were not 
as consistent, confirming the nature of the test is not as predictive as that for HD.  This was to 
be expected as it is known that the genetic mutations associated with hereditary breast 
cancer do not confer a 100% risk (Evans et. al., 2006).  This difference in predictability was 
mirrored in the inconsistent responses of the insurers to the breast cancer genetic test.  
Initially the insurers would request the test result and additional information to make a 
decision, suggesting that the predictive value is not 100%.  However, when asked for their 
underwriting decision with regard to a positive genetic test, their response was based on the 
test result alone, which would be correct, provided that the gene fault was known for the 
family.  The insurers’ responses to a negative genetic test was used to determine if their 
interpretation of the predictive value of the genetic test had changed.  All the insurers 
provided more favourable underwriting terms based on a negative test result alone, 
suggesting that these genetic tests are 100% predictive, and that their perception had 
changed.  Again, this is only true if the genetic mutation is known for the family.   
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These inconsistencies were further highlighted in their response to the hypothetical case 
study.  In the initial question, more than half of the insurers would base their decision on a 
combination of both screening tests and genetic test results.  However, their responses 
changed when the complexities of the genetic mechanisms for a hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer syndrome were included - then the genetic test result was the only factor used 
to make a decision.  The researcher interpreted this as an uncertainty in their understanding 
of the predictive nature of these genetic tests and superficial knowledge.   
 
The inconsistencies in the response to genetic information revealed that the genetic 
mechanisms, genetic testing and importance of a family history for hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer syndrome were poorly understood.  Breast cancer is more common than 
Huntington disease, as 5-10% of cases are genetic.  Therefore it is important to know how to 
interpret family history and/or genetic test for accurate risk assessment.  This highlights the 
industry’s need for training to increase their knowledge regarding genetic disorders and to 
have access to specialists for advice. It also revealed a potential risk for genetic 
discrimination as the same insurer may offer different terms based on the identical genetic 
information. 
4.1.4 Impact of preventative care on the prediction of risk for underwriting  
The insurance industry’s underwriting response to presymptomatic individuals at risk for 
breast cancer who had prophylactic treatment, was not proportionate to the impact this has 
on reducing the applicant’s risk.  For an individual at risk for breast cancer, with a strong 
family history or a positive genetic test, a bilateral mastectomy has been shown to reduce the 
risk of developing cancer by 90% (Evans, 2006).  The response to preventative or 
prophylactic treatment was shown to be inconsistent as only one company considered the 
inherent value of this treatment.  In contrast, as part of their standard underwriting process all 
insurers would reward individuals at risk for CVD for beneficial lifestyle changes such as 
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weight loss.  The researcher proposes that this action alone could be deemed as a form of 
genetic discrimination.       
 
Even for the one insurer that would offer standard rates to an individual that had undergone 
prophylactic surgery, such as a mastectomy, the insurer would still be exposed to the 
associated risk of a claim for ovarian cancer.  Unlike with breast cancer, the standard 
screening tests currently used, trans-vaginal ultrasound, pelvic examinations and tests for 
cancer markers, are not optimal to detect the early stages of ovarian cancer which would 
allow for prevention and reduction of cancer risk for the individual.  Therefore, for certain 
families, a true indication of reduced risk would be the combination of a mastectomy and 
oophorectomy.  The latter can reduce the risk of ovarian cancer by 96% (Evans, 2006). 
These complexities once again highlight the need for specialist support in the interpretation of 
risk for individual cases. 
 
4.2 Inconsistencies identified in the underwriting approach to genetic 
information 
 
This study has shown that the insurance industry’s underwriting approaches to genetic 
conditions are not always consistent.  These inconsistencies present an issue in that the 
same information can be interpreted by the various insurers as a different risk i.e. an 
individual with a strong family history but for whom no genetic fault was identified may be 
considered as a standard risk by some companies and at an increased risk because of family 
history by others.  These discrepancies appeared to result from an inability to interpret the 
predictive value of the information, based on a limited understanding of the genetic 
mechanisms of the medical condition and the type of mutation analysis performed.  Using 
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these factors to interpret the predictive value of the information is complex and requires 
specialist genetic support.   
4.2.1 Potential for anti-selection and genetic discrimination based on underwriting 
inconsistencies  
As demonstrated, these discrepancies denote a potential for increased risk exposure and 
genetic discrimination.  Insurers are vulnerable for exposure to increased risk or anti-
selection through inconsistencies in their definitions of risk factors used to evaluate family 
history, their interpretation of a family history and genetic test results.  Similarly, the 
inconsistencies in the definition and interpretation of risk factors can also be perceived as 
discriminatory, as insurers respond differently to the same information.  The unpredictability 
in the interpretation of a genetic test may also be considered as discriminatory, as it was 
noted to vary between insurers and for the same insurer under different circumstances.  The 
applicant can therefore be provided with different underwriting terms based on the same 
genetic information.  This disparity in treatment may be thought to be as a result of the 
genetic information and not necessarily the inconsistencies in its interpretation, and therefore 
be thought to be a form of genetic discrimination. 
4.2.2 Potential risk of genetic discrimination based on the insurance industry’s 
perceptions of presymptomatic individuals 
Most companies were shown to consider a presymptomatic individual with a positive genetic 
test as having the condition regardless of whether they had received prophylactic treatment.  
Because a correlation between the predictive value of the genetic test and the association of 
the medical condition with a presymptomatic individual exists this interpretation was not 
always correct as the predictive value of the genetic test would need to be considered. From 
this observation the researcher was concerned as throughout the study adverse underwriting 
terms were applied to a policy for a positive genetic test.  Based on the insurers’ perception 
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of presymptomatic individuals, the resulting underwriting decision may not always be 
justifiable.  For insurers, misconceptions may exist in the interpretation of a genetic test in 
relation to the existence of a condition and the value of preventative treatment. Their 
response is also indicative of a form of genetic determinism.  Their responses contradict the 
conclusion drawn in a previous paper that the risk of discrimination is small due to the 
effectiveness of preventative care in reducing risk of disease (Kotze et al., 2004).   
 
These findings highlight the publics’ concern that by making genetic tests available to 
insurers their actions could result in limited access to insurance, different medical 
underwriting protocols and affect the affordability of cover (Christianson, 2007).  However, 
these outcomes would be acceptable if the actions of the insurers are proven to be actuarially 
fair and based on effective interpretation of the genetic information. 
 
4.2.3 The relationship between these inconsistencies and the value of the current 
support available to the insurance companies 
The insurance companies’ response when requiring assistance with the use and 
interpretation of a genetic test result, was to either consult with their CMOs or their 
reinsurance companies, yet only one CMO was a genetic specialist.  The support offered by 
the reinsurance companies was in accordance with their underwriting standards, established 
in consultation with their international experts, and it would be reasonable to assume that this 
would enable the insurance companies to make appropriate risk assessment decisions.  
From the inconsistencies noted, the researcher considered that these were as a result of 
these manuals not being consulted prior to the interviews that the insurance companies were 
unable to translate the information provided into their risk assessment process or that 
insufficient information is available for appropriate risk assessment.  Of concern is that the 
responses from the reinsurers did not always align with the predictive nature of the genetic 
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test and they may lack the knowledge to provide specialist support in response to genetic 
information. 
 
Even if this information is available and appropriate for risk assessment, its value to all 
sectors of the South African population is unknown.  The reason for this is that much of the 
genetic research has been based on European populations, and it is well known that these 
findings do not automatically apply to all races and ethnic groups (Bamshad, Wooding, 
Salisburg, & Stephens, 2004).  As South Africa has such a diverse population, where the 
majority race originates from sub-Saharan Africa, these recommendations may be of little 
value. 
 
Insurance companies need to be able to access expert advice specific to the unique needs of 
South Africa. 
4.3 Insurance industry’s knowledge of the ‘LOA Code of Conduct: 
Genetic Testing’ 
The LOA Code (ASISA Standard) on genetic testing was established to reduce the risk of 
genetic discrimination whilst providing the insurers with the opportunity for appropriate risk 
assessment.  For this study it was important to consider whether these goals have been 
achieved and the first step would be to ascertain whether the insurers comply with the LOA 
Code principles.  Most of the insurers were highly knowledgeable of the LOA Code and were 
compliant with its principles, especially in relation to their various administrative functions and 
roles, the definition of a ‘genetic test’ and the manner in which a genetic test result may be 
accessed.  They seemed to falter in the interpretation of valid genetic test results and their 
referral to the LOA/ASISA for guidance.  It is uncertain whether ASISA was in a position to 
provide this support as the information was not readily available when requested.     
 87 
 
4.3.1 Effectiveness of the regulations in limiting anti-selection and genetic 
discrimination 
The insurers’ actions with regards to obtaining specialist support did not fully align with the 
processes suggested in the LOA Code or the ASISA Standard.  They stated that they would 
contact their CMO or reinsurance company for assistance in the interpretation of genetic test 
results and none mentioned the LOA (ASISA).  The LOA Code makes allowance for the use 
of the CMO and that the CMO in turn can contact the specialists, but it does not mention the 
reinsurance companies.   
 
The LOA Code states that a subcommittee of the LOA was available to provide support in the 
interpretation of genetic test results and the factors that determine their validity.  This support 
continues to be available through ASISA, theoretically.   In addition the ASISA Standard also 
states that the Medical Underwriting Standards Committee (MUSC) would evaluate the 
genetic tests currently available and compile a list of genetic tests that are considered 
valuable to the insurance industry for underwriting purposes.  
 
When ASISA was requested to provide detail of the tests deemed to be valid for the 
insurance industry, the criteria used to assess these and the manner in which the results 
should be interpreted, they were unable to provide this information.  What is unknown is 
whether this information exists and therefore whether specialist support is provided by 
ASISA.  With this knowledge it is also unknown whether the inconsistencies noted in the 
interpretation of genetic information by the insurance industry can be attributed to this lack of 
available support.  Currently for the insurance companies, there appears to be limited support 
in the use and interpretation of genetic information, and the support offered is not available 
when requested.  
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The effectiveness of the regulations in limiting anti-selection and genetic discrimination could 
not be assessed as the existence of these factors could not be proven and all the provisions 
of the Code were not available.   
 
This highlights a need for available access to specialist support for the interpretation of 
genetic information and perhaps the reassessment of the goals in the ASISA code to ensure 
that the various parties are able to fulfil their functional roles.   
4.4 Recommendations 
Areas of risk for anti-selection and genetic discrimination in the underwriting process of 
genetic information have been identified.  To ensure the appropriate use of genetic 
information in the future, changes can be implemented to establish protocols pre-
emptively that will reduce this effect. This is important as currently the industry is not 
exposed to many genetic tests but the number of tests available is continuously 
increasing as is the complexity of their interpretation.  The following recommendations are 
based on the findings of this study. 
• Inconsistencies identified in the underwriting approach to genetic information need 
to be addressed by the insurance companies.  These include the different 
interpretations of a family history and the predictive value of a genetic test. 
• The insurance companies need to establish a uniformity in their underwriting 
practices, particularly their definition of underwriting risk factors such as a relevant 
family history. 
• Basic support for the use of genetic information should be provided through the 
companies’ CMOs, the reinsurers and ASISA.  The researcher recommends that 
this process could be used to identify cases that need to be referred for specialist 
support and risk analysis. 
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• The researcher proposes the establishment of a genetic service team for the 
insurance industry. 
• Based on these negotiations the genetic academic departments should establish 
teams of experts that would be available for specialist consultation by the insurance 
industry.  The function of these teams would include:  
o Evaluate unique underwriting cases by providing an interpretation of the 
genetic information    
o Assess and define the predictive value of current and new genetic tests to 
the insurance industry. 
o Work with actuaries to establish the actuarial value of the genetic tests by 
using actuarial models to assist this process (Daykin et al., 2003; Knoppers 
et al., 2004)  
o For all cases this team will need to consider all the complex variables 
associated with genetic conditions such as the demographics of South Africa  
• The researcher proposes that genetic counselling services be used in the process of 
genetic testing.   
• Alternate products need to be developed to address unique needs 
 
Genetic services are valuable to the underwriting process as factors such as the 
interpretation of the family history, validity of the genetic test and interpretation of the 
genetic test results would be established prior to risk assessment, thereby assisting the 
underwriting process whilst protecting the privacy of other family members.   
 
These latter points illustrate the value of the various disciplines working together in a 
holistic manner, as is summarised in the comment, “Social circumstances of affected 
families would benefit more if geneticists and insurers worked together” (Raeburn, 2002).  
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4.5 Limitations 
There were a number of limitations identified in this study: 
• The focus of this study was to gain insight into the insurance industry’s understanding 
of genetic information.  The interviewees’ understanding was affected by their level of 
prior knowledge.  Certain of the responses seemed to be more theoretical than a 
reflection of the interviewees own understanding and knowledge.     
• Only one participant from each company was interviewed, and their responses may 
not have been a true reflection of the company’s underwriting approach.   
• The participants mentioned that they used underwriting risk factors in the decision-
making process, but it is unknown to what extent these were used and this may have 
affected the results  
• A pilot study would have been useful to identify areas that needed to be amended to 
enable a more thorough assessment of the underwriting process 
• The examples of genetic conditions used in this study are well known, therefore it may 
have been more appropriate to use less well known examples to determine the 
insurers’ deeper level of understanding.   
• A large portion of this study was based on the LOA Code which changed to the 
ASISA Standard during the research period.  At the time of this study the information 
requested from ASISA was not available and many conclusions were based on this 
outcome.  This may not be completely accurate as there may have been 
administrative limitations due to the change in the structure of the organisation.   
• There was little analysis of the support provided by the reinsurance companies.  
Greater insight into the insurers underwriting processes may have been obtained if 
the recommended underwriting decisions from the reinsurance underwriting manuals 
were used for comparative purposes. 
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• This study did not consider that perhaps the information used by the interviewees was 
limited by the questions asked at application stage.  Many companies required 
questionnaires specific for the genetic condition or family history.  A summary of the 
questions asked and the interpretation of the information received may have provided 
more insight into the insurers’ understanding of genetic information and prediction of 
risk.   
4.6 Future research and considerations 
 
The following should be considered for further research to provide greater insight into the 
use of genetic information by the insurance industry: 
• An evaluation of the use of genetic information in the provision of healthcare in the 
private health insurance sector of South Africa would be important.   
• The focus of research has been on genetic tests alone.  It would be valuable to 
compare the predictive value of family history, medical history and status and genetic 
tests, for the different types of genetic conditions, to enhance the underwriting 
practices of the insurance companies.   
• This study focused on the insurers’ perspective of their behaviour in the use of genetic 
tests, and therefore it would be valuable to interview affected families to understand 
their experiences and whether they align with these practices.   
• There is a need for a formalised independent validation of genetic tests made 
available to the general population and regulation of the companies that offer these 
services. 
• Consideration of ways for geneticists, other health care professionals and insurers to 
work together to establish best practices with the least risk of anti-selection or genetic 
discrimination. 
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4.7 Summary 
From the analysis of the life insurance industry’s underwriting approach to genetic information 
and genetic tests it can be concluded that the insurance companies’ response to genetic 
information was generally in alignment with their standard practices.  Due to the complexities 
associated with genetic disorders inconsistencies were identified in the companies’ 
approaches.  These inconsistencies could potentially increase risk exposure for the insurers 
and reveal opportunities for genetic discrimination.  The irregularities appear to be based on 
the insurance companies’ limited understanding of genetic mechanisms and other factors that 
affect the predictive nature of the complex information received.  The researcher feels that 
the support currently available is either insufficient or inaccessible.  The results of this study 
highlight the need for the insurance industry to access specialists who have the expertise to 
assist in converting genetic information into a predictive risk for life insurance underwriting 
purposes.   
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Appendix A: Summary of insurance companies considered for 
this study and selection of candidates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Insurance Company Source of Information Business Eligibility
1LifeDirect Insurance www.1lifedirect.co.za Direct individual life underwriting Yes
African Life www.africanlife.co.za Underwritten by Sanlam No
Alexander Forbes Life www.alexanderforbes.com Short-term insurance, credit life and group risk No
Algoa Insurance Company www.aicinsurance.co.za Group riskand absenteeism management No
All Life www.alllife.co.za HIV management No
AltRisk www.altrisk.co.za Individual life copver Yes
Assupol www.assupol.co.za Individual Life Insurance (low income earners) Yes
AVBOB Life www.avbob.co.za Funeral cover No
Capital Alliance www.capitalalliance.co.za Underwritten by Liberty Life No
Channel Life www.channellife.co.za Group riskbenefits No
Clientele Life www.clientellife.co.za Group risk benefits No
Constania Life Telephonic contact Credit life, accidental cover and funeral cover No
Discovery Life www.discovery.co.za Individual Life Insurance Yes
Hollard Life www.hollard.co.za Provided by other insurance companies No
Liberty Life www.liberty.co.za Individual life insurance Yes
Lion of Africa Assurance www.lionlife.co.za Funeral Life No
Medscheme Life Telephonic contact Group risk No
Metropolitan Life www.metropolitan.co.za Individual life insurance Yes
Momentum Life www.momentum.co.za Individual life insurance Yes
Nedgroup www.boelife.co.za Credit life No
Nestlife www.nestlife.co.za Group risk No
New Era Life Insurance www.neweralife.com Health and funeral cover No
Old Mutual www.oldmutual.com Individual life insurance Yes
Outsurance Life Insurance www.outsurance.co.za Credit Life and underwitten by Momentum Life No
Professional Provident Society (PPS) www.pps.co.za Individual life insurance Yes
Prosperity Life www.pfa.co.za Funeral and group risk No
Real People Insurance Company Telephonic contact Funeral cover No
Regent Life Insurance www.regent.co.za Aviation, credit life, funeral, motor, property, av No
Rentmeester www.liberty.co.za Underwritten by Liberty Life No
Safrican Life www.safrican.co.za Underwritten by Channel Life, funeral cover No
Sage Life www.sage.co.za Underwritten by Momentum Life No
Sanlam Life www.sanlam.co.za Individual life insurance Yes
Union Life www.unionlife.co.za Funeral cover No
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Insurers and Reinsurers 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY RESEARCHER ONLY 
 
 
Date of interview: 
 
Insurance company: 
 
Interviewee and position held: 
 
Telephone or face-to-face appointment: 
 
Interview conducted by: 
 
Time commenced: 
 
Time ended: 
 
Identifier Code: 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INSURERS/REINSURER 
 
Identifier Code No.: 
 
 
Please note that it is assumed that if there is no response to a question that you were unable to respond 
based on your company not having a defined protocol, process or practice for the respective scenario. 
 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL UNDERWRITING QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO GENETIC INFORMATION 
 
1. Please describe what you consider a genetic test to be. 
 
Purpose: To determine the participants understanding of what a genetic test is relating to the 
definition in the Code.  To determine the participant’s perception of the predictive value of a genetic 
test. 
 
Probing statements:  DNA/chromosomes, biochemical, a combination and predictive value. 
 
 
2. For which of the following individual life insurance products do you perform individual medical 
underwriting on the applicant? 
 
Purpose: To confirm that company does meet the eligibility criteria for this study and that they 
perform underwriting for all benefits. 
 
 
Life Cover Benefit Lump Sum Disability Benefit (i.e. Capital 
Disability) 
 
Monthly Income Benefit (i.e. PHI)  Severe or Critical Illness Benefit 
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3. Define the criteria that a policyholder will need to meet to become eligible for a benefit payment 
under the following benefits: 
 
Purpose:  To establish if any differences exist between the companies in their benefit definitions and 
descriptions because of the impact that this may have on underwriting practices. The benefit 
definitions were summarised by using probing statements specific to the different benefits, to ensure 
that optimal comparisons were made. 
 
3.1. Life Cover Benefit 
 
Probing statements:  
• Payment on death? 
• Term policy (the insurance cover provided is for a limited period of time.  This limits the 
insurers’ risk exposure, especially of value for late-onset  medical conditions) 
3.2. Lump Sum Disability Benefit 
 
Probing statements 
• Own/any occupation 
• Physical impairment 
• Functional impairment 
• Combination of occupation and/or functional impairment and/or physical impairment. 
 
3.3. Monthly income benefit 
 
Probing statements: 
• Defined based on ability to perform own/any job/ occupation 
• Waiting period options (the time from the event until the commencement of benefit 
payments).  It plays an important role as the shorter the waiting period the greater the risk 
exposure for the insurer.  Options for waiting periods include 7 days, 1 month, 3 months, 6 
months, 12 months and 24 months. 
• Payment from day 1: With a 7 day waiting period there is an option for the benefit payment 
to commence from the first day of disablement.  If this option is selected insurers are 
exposed to a greater risk. 
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3.4. Severe Illness Benefit (SIB) or Critical Illness Benefit (CIB) 
Probing statements: 
• Core CIB 
• Core CIB payment (100% or severity) 
• Comprehensive CIB 
• Comprehensive CIB payment (100% or severity).     
 
4. Do your standard underwriting requirements include the following: 
 
Purpose: To obtain the underwriting protocol or standard underwriting practice of the company.  Use 
this as a foundation to assess whether their underwriting behavior changes based on information 
received and do these practices align with the industry standards (reinsurance companies’ 
practices).  
 
4.1. Application form 
 
Always     Dependent on sum assured 
 
Dependent on benefit   Dependent on both sum assured and benefit 
 
 
 
4.2. Medical reports from personal medical attendant 
 
Always     Dependent on sum assured 
 
Dependent on benefit   Dependent on both sum assured and benefit 
 
4.3. Pathology tests 
 
Always     Dependent on sum assured 
 
Dependent on benefit   Dependent on both sum assured and benefit 
 
 
 98 
 
Please provide a list of the standard pathology tests required. 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________ 
 
 
5. Tick or complete the box which best describes the level of analysis of information, when the 
response is as follows: 
Purpose: To determine the company’s underwriting behaviour in response to the type of 
underwriting information received for a specific medical condition.  Assess whether this complies 
with the LOA Code in terms of the use of genetic test results.  Furthermore identify other factors that 
may influence the underwriting process 
 
Probing statements: Responses needed to be provided per benefit type i.e. life cover benefit, 
capital disability benefit, monthly income benefit and CIB. 
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Information 
provided at 
underwriting 
stage (Response) 
Underwriting Procedure 
a)Noted without 
requesting 
additional 
information 
b)Request 
additional 
information 
c) What 
additional 
information (b) 
will you 
require? 
d) Request 
additional 
information in 
view of the 
presence of 
other factors. 
e) What are the 
additional 
factors which 
combined with 
disease 
information (c) 
increases risk? 
Family history of 
Huntington 
disease 
     
Family history of 
breast cancer 
     
Family history of 
haemophilia 
 
 
 
    
Family history of 
cardiovascular 
disease 
     
Genetic test for 
Huntington 
disease 
 
 
 
 
    
Genetic test for 
breast cancer 
     
Genetic test for 
cardiovascular 
disease 
     
Genetic test for 
haemophilia 
     
Please note: A genetic test refers to a test performed on the DNA, RNA or chromosomes, and does not 
include biochemical test results.  
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6. Please provide your understanding of a genetic condition and list all the genetic conditions 
specifically detailed in your application form: 
 
Purpose: To determine whether the representative considers a genetic condition to be monogenic 
or multifactorial, and the association with inheritance i.e. would they consider a family history.  Check 
that the conditions provided align with their understanding 
 
Probing statements: Monogenic, multifactorial, combination of monogenic and multifactorial, 
inheritance 
 
6.1. What would the next step be in the underwriting process should any of these conditions be 
present or where there is a high risk of their occurrence based on the applicant’s response? 
 
Purpose: To establish the company’s response to a genetic condition and determine whether they 
would request a genetic test or underwriting requirements not aligned with the underwriting protocol.  
Furthermore, whether the risk of an adverse underwriting decision was increased based on a lack of 
information. 
 
6.2. If the applicant provides additional personal medical history information detailing a genetic 
condition not included on the application form, what would the next step be in the 
underwriting process? 
 
Purpose: To establish the company’s response to a rare genetic condition and determine whether 
they would request a genetic test or underwriting requirements not aligned with the underwriting 
protocol.  Furthermore, whether the risk of an adverse underwriting decision was increased based 
on a lack of information. Determine who provides them with specialist support regarding genetic 
tests and do their actions align with the LOA Code. 
 
 
7. What would your underwriting decision be on receipt of the different forms of medical 
underwriting information in respect of the different medical conditions (use the abbreviations 
specified below): 
Purpose: To determine the impact/value of different forms of underwriting information.  Assess 
whether their interpretation is justifiable or whether their actions create an opportunity for 
discrimination.  Does their use of a genetic test align with the LOA Code? 
 101 
 
 
Probing statements: Responses needed to be provided per benefit type i.e. life cover benefit, 
capital disability benefit, monthly income benefit and critical illness benefits.  Insurers were asked to 
consider other factors that would influence their decision process. 
  
Genetic 
Condition 
Source of information 
Family history 
with no 
diagnosis in the 
applicant (FH) 
Positive genetic 
test in the 
applicant (GT) 
Medical history 
of symptoms 
pertaining to 
condition in the 
applicant (MHx) 
Family and 
medical history 
of condition with 
no diagnosis in 
the applicant 
(FHMH) 
Huntington 
disease (HD) 
    
Breast Cancer – 
BRCA (BrCa) 
    
Haemophilia 
(HP) 
 
 
   
Cardiovascular 
disease (CVD 
    
 
The key of the various underwriting decisions needed to complete the table: 
SD – Standard rates    Load – Increase in premium 
Exclude – Exclude condition/disease  Decline – Decline 
 
 
8. Do you regard an individual with a positive genetic test as having a pre-existing condition  
if:- 
 
Purpose: In the insurance context a ‘pre-existing condition’ refers to a medical condition that an 
individual may have known about or sought medical attention for in the past.  It addresses two 
issues: is an asymptomatic individual considered as having a ‘condition’ if they have a positive 
genetic test, and the company’s understanding of a the predictive value of a genetic test. 
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8.1. They are not receiving any treatment or preventative management Yes  No 
 
8.2. They are or have been on treatment for the condition   Yes  No 
 
8.3. They have received preventative management   Yes  No 
 
 
9. Have you had a case of adverse selection as a result of non-disclosure of a genetic condition i.e. 
genetic test results, positive family history and/or positive medical/clinical history? 
 
Purpose: To determine the existence of adverse selection 
Yes      No 
 
 
If yes please complete the following table: 
Genetic condition 
Date of 
Application 
Information 
source i.e. genetic 
test, FH or clinical 
history 
Date of diagnosis Financial impact 
     
     
     
     
 
10. In the event that an applicant provides you with proof of a negative genetic test what effect would 
this information have on the underwriting decision?  What, If any, would the new underwriting 
decision be? 
 
Purpose: Confirm whether their actions align with the LOA Code and if their decision is appropriate 
based on the predictive value of the information received for a specific condition. 
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Probing statement: The companies were asked to respond based on the medical conditions used 
in examples, Huntington disease, breast cancer and cardiovascular disease. 
 
 
Genetic condition 
The underwriting decision will 
be adjusted (Y/N) 
The updated underwriting 
decision (please use the code 
as per question 7.) 
   
   
   
   
  
 
SECTION B: GENERAL ADMINISTRATION QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO GENETIC TESTS 
 
Purpose:  All these questions relate to specific criteria detailed in the LOA Code.  The reason for this is 
to determine whether the company is compliant with the guidelines of the LOA Code. 
 
1. Who is the genetic underwriter for your insurer, and what is their qualification? 
 
 
2. Do you have a particular protocol in terms of the storage of genetic test results received in 
support of a policy application?  An example is a database of genetic test results. 
 
3. If you receive a genetic test result, who do you consult with to interpret the results into 
information that is relevant to the underwriting process? 
 
 
4. Who provides the underwriters with training in genetics? 
 
5. Who are the medical specialists that you contact for assistance with queries relating to genetic 
conditions or tests? 
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SECTION C: HYPOTHETICAL CASES 
 
Purpose:  Section C was designed to assess the company’s level of compliance with their previously 
defined standard underwriting practices i.e. is the theory applied in practice, and therefore is the 
company acting ‘fairly’ towards the applicant.   
 
The following section consists of questions pertaining to hypothetical underwriting cases. 
 
 
HYPOTHETICAL CASE I 
 
John and Henry are brothers, both over the age of 30.  They have both contacted your company separately to 
purchase individual life insurance policies.  According to their application forms their father aged 55 has just 
been diagnosed with Huntington disease (HD).  Furthermore it is noted in Henry’s application form that he has 
had a short history of tremors and memory loss and his GP has ascribed these symptoms to stress. 
Underwriting for JOHN: 
 
1. What , if any, additional underwriting requirements would you request? 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A5, family history of Huntington disease 
 
2. Based on this information what would your underwriting decision be for an application requesting 
access to a disability and/or severe illness benefit i.e. provide at standard rates, load the premiums, 
exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline the policy or others (please stipulate what). 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A7, family history of Huntington disease 
 
 
 
3. What would you do if you discovered that John was adopted? 
 
Analysis: Determine company’s understanding of inheritance 
 
 
 
 105 
 
4. What would the effect be on the underwriting decision if at application stage you are informed that 
John had a genetic test, and he tested positive for HD? 
Analysis: Compare with Section A7, positive genetic test for Huntington disease 
 
 
5. What would you do if you received a copy of a HD genetic test for John after the policy had 
commenced that indicated that he tested negative for HD?  (The underwriting decision was initially 
based on the family history only) 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A10, for a Huntington disease genetic test 
 
Underwriting for HENRY: 
 
6. What , if any, additional underwriting requirements would you request? 
Analysis: Compare with Section A5, family history of Huntington disease, should differ to 
Question 1 due to the history of tremors and memory loss 
 
 
7. Based on this information what would your underwriting decision be for an application requesting 
access to a disability and/or severe illness benefit i.e. provide at standard rates, load the premiums, 
exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline the policy or others (please stipulate what) ? 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A7 family history of Huntington disease, should differ to 
Question 2 due to the history of tremors and memory loss 
 
8. What would the effect be on the underwriting decision if at application stage you are informed that 
Henry had a genetic test, and he tested positive for HD? 
Analysis: Compare with Section A7, positive genetic test for Huntington disease.  If there 
are cases where terms have been applied, check that these have taken into consideration 
the medical history of tremors and memory loss 
9. What would the effect be on the underwriting decision if at application stage you are informed that 
Henry had a genetic test, and he tested negative for HD? 
Analysis: Compare with Section A10 but should differ to Question 5 due to the history of 
tremors and memory loss 
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HYPOTHETICAL CASE II 
 
Mary is a 35 year old with a sister of 40 years who is currently being treated for breast cancer.  Mary’s mother 
passed away at the age of 42 from ovarian cancer.  In view of this family history Mary has gone for regular 
annual mammograms.  In addition she has been for genetic counselling and has had a genetic test for three 
BRCA1 gene mutations. 
 
Underwriting for MARY: 
 
1. What , if any, additional underwriting requirements would you request? 
 
Analysis: compare with section A5, BRCA test has been performed and family history of 
breast cancer. 
 
2. Based on this information what would your underwriting decision be for an application requesting 
access to a disability and/or severe illness benefit i.e. provide at standard rates, load the premiums, 
exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline the policy or others (please stipulate what) ? 
 
Analysis: compare with Section A7, family history and medical information relating to 
breast cancer. 
 
 
3. At application stage Mary provides you with the results of BRCA1 genetic test which states that she 
has tested positive for the BRCA1 mutation.  Would you request additional information for 
underwriting purposes, and if so what would this be? Using this information, what would your 
underwriting decision be for accessing disability and/or severe illness benefits  i.e. provide at 
standard rates, load the premiums, exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline the policy 
or others (please stipulate what) ? 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A5, positive genetic test, and Section A7, positive genetic 
test. 
 
4. At application stage for a disability and/or severe illness benefit Mary provides you with the results of 
her genetic test for the BRCA1 mutations, for which she tested negative.  You have been informed 
that both her sister and mother have tested positive for the BRCA2 . Would you request additional 
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information for underwriting purposes, and if so what would this be? Using this information, what 
would your underwriting decision be for accessing disability and/or severe illness benefits  i.e. 
provide at standard rates, load the premiums, exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline 
the policy or others (please stipulate what)? 
 
Analysis: Compare with Section A5, family history of breast cancer only, and Section A7, 
family history of breast cancer only. 
. 
 
HYPOTHETICAL CASE III 
 
Frank is a healthy 40 year old who does not smoke, he exercises regularly and is not overweight.  In Frank’s 
application it is evident that his father, mother and brother all suffer from hypertension and/or 
hypercholesterolaemia.  Furthermore his father has suffered two heart attacks.  Frank informs you that he 
found a direct-to-the-consumer genetic test to ascertain his risk of developing heart disease.  His results 
indicated that he is healthy and has a low risk of developing cardiovascular disease. 
 
Underwriting for FRANK: 
 
1. What , if any, additional underwriting requirements would you request? 
 
Analysis: compare with section A5, cardiovascular disease genetic test has been 
performed and family history of cardiovascular disease. 
 
2. Based on this information what would your underwriting decision be for an application requesting 
access to a disability and/or severe illness benefit i.e. provide at standard rates, load the premiums, 
exclude the disease, impose a waiting period, decline the policy or others (please stipulate what) ? 
 
Analysis: compare with section A7, cardiovascular disease genetic test has been 
performed and family history of cardiovascular disease. 
 
 
 
 108 
 
 
 
NATIONAL HEALTH 
LABORATORY SERVICES 
 
University of the Witwatersrand, School Of Pathology 
Division of Human Genetics 
 
Cnr De Korte & Hospital Streets, Johannesburg, 2001  PO Box 1038, Johannesburg 2000 
 
Telephone: +27-11-489-9224/9223/9211                    Telefax: +27-11-489-9226 or +27-11-489-9209 
 
Professor AL Christianson 011 489-9239             Professor A Krause 011 489-9219 
Professor M Ramsay 011 489-9214 Professor H Soodyall 011 489-9208     Dr AB Lane 011 489-9221 
 
Appendix C: Research Project Information Sheet 
Title:  The use of genetic tests by the individual life insurance industry in South Africa. 
My name is Noelene Kinsley and I am a student doing my Masters in Genetic Counselling 
through the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
A research project forms part of this Masters programme and the aim of my study is to 
determine how genetic tests are used in obtaining an individual life insurance policy and the 
associated risk of genetic discrimination and adverse selection.  To meet this aim I require 
input from life insurance and reinsurance companies.  I wish:- 
• to evaluate the underwriting approach to using genetic information and the effect of 
this information on the underwriting decision 
• to compare the underwriting guidelines and application forms of the insurer with the 
reported processes and decisions.   
• to investigate the effectiveness of the Life Offices Association’s regulations pertaining 
to the use of genetic testing by insurance companies in limiting adverse selection and 
genetic discrimination. 
My project requires the completion of a questionnaire by relevant representatives of the 
insurance or reinsurance company and access to information detailing underwriting protocols 
and the respective application forms.  The representative of the insurance company is a 
person(s) who is actively involved in defining the underwriting protocols and practices, 
functions as a mediator and has the authority to make decisions pertaining to ‘special’ 
underwriting cases.   
You have been identified as the relevant person in your company and therefore I wish to 
invite you to participate in this study.  Participation in this study is voluntary and you can 
withdraw at any time.  Should you wish to discuss this matter further or if you have any 
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queries regarding the research process please contact me on (011) 489 9227 or 082 547 
5720.  Your agreement to participate in this study will be much appreciated. 
 
Please can you confirm whether you, as a representative of your company, will participate in 
this study by completing the attached consent form and faxing it to (011) 489 9226/9209 or 
emailing it to noelene.kinsley@nhls.ac.za. 
 
Research process: 
For convenience the questionnaire will be completed in an interview setting at the respective 
insurers’ or reinsurers’ offices.  The duration of the interview process is expected to be one 
hour.  For auditing purposes an audio recording will be made of the interview, with consent 
from the participant.  The questionnaire will be sent to the relevant individual(s) prior to the 
appointment to allow for preparation and for queries to be answered upfront.  All information 
will remain confidential. Confidentiality will be achieved through the use of a random coding 
system, whereby each insurer or reinsurer will be issued with a unique numerical code.   
All data collected will be stored under lock and key within the Division of Human Genetics, 
University of the Witwatersrand for a maximum period of 6 years. 
You may address any queries or complaints which may arise from this research project to 
Prof. Cleaton-Jones, the Chair of the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical) of the 
University of the Witwatersrand.  The contact number is 011 717 2635. 
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NATIONAL HEALTH 
LABORATORY SERVICES 
 
University of the Witwatersrand, School Of Pathology 
Division of Human Genetics 
 
Cnr De Korte & Hospital Streets, Johannesburg, 2001  PO Box 1038, Johannesburg 2000 
 
Telephone: +27-11-489-9224/9223/9211                    Telefax: +27-11-489-9226 or +27-11-489-9209 
 
Professor AL Christianson 011 489-9239             Professor A Krause 011 489-9219 
Professor M Ramsay 011 489-9214 Professor H Soodyall 011 489-9208     Dr AB Lane 011 489-9221 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Consent to participate in an interview 
I……………………………………(Name), am currently employed in the position of 
……………………………………..(Job Title) at…………………………………..(Insurance or 
Reinsurance Company) and hereby agree to participate in the research study titled “The use 
of genetic tests by the individual life insurance industry in South Africa” conducted by 
Noelene Kinsley, a masters student of the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. 
I confirm that in the company I have an active role in defining the underwriting protocols and 
practices, I function as a mediator and I hold a position of authority to make decisions 
pertaining to ‘special’ underwriting cases.   
It has been explained to me and I understand that: 
 
• All information provided will remain confidential 
• All names, including that of my company, will remain confidential 
• The completed questionnaire will only be used toward the completion of a research 
project 
• The completed questionnaire and voice recording will be the property of the 
researcher and the institute and will not be shared with any other parties unless so 
agreed  
• There is no remuneration for participating in the study 
• Copies of the completed questionnaire and voice recording may be made available 
to me  
• The company I represent will be acknowledged by the researcher, unless otherwise 
advised 
• On completion the results of the study will be made available on request 
Signed…………………………………………………. Date………………………………… 
Telephone no.:……………………………………….. Cell No…………………………….. 
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Appendix E: Recording consent form 
I……………………………………(Name), am currently employed in the position of 
……………………………………..(Job Title) at…………………………………..(Insurance or 
Reinsurance Company) and hereby agree to participate in the research study titled “The use 
of genetic tests by the individual life insurance industry in South Africa” conducted by 
Noelene Kinsley, a masters student of the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. 
 
I consent to a voice recording of this interview and understand that this is solely for auditing 
purposes. 
I confirm that in the company I have an active role in defining the underwriting protocols and 
practices, I function as a mediator and that I hold a position of authority to make decisions 
pertaining to ‘special’ underwriting cases.   
It has been explained to me and I understand that: 
• All information provided will remain confidential 
• All names, including that of my company, will remain anonymous 
• The completed questionnaire will only be used toward the completion of a research 
project 
• The completed questionnaire and voice recording will be the property of the researcher 
and the institute and will not be shared with any other parties unless so agreed  
• There is no remuneration for participating in the study 
• Copies of the completed questionnaire and voice recording may be made available to me  
• The company I represent will be acknowledged by the researcher, unless otherwise 
advised 
• On completion the results of the study will be made available on request 
 
Interviewee’s signature:    Interviewer’s signature: 
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Appendix G: Additional underwriting requirements 
Table G1: Summary of the additional underwriting requirements of the insurance 
and reinsurance companies in response to information received for specific 
medical conditions 
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Appendix H: Underwriting decisions for medical conditions 
Table H1:  Insurers underwriting decisions for Huntington disease  
 
Please note that the abbreviations are as follows: SD – Standard rates; D – Decline 
  Table H2:  Insurers underwriting decisions for breast cancer 
 
Please note that the abbreviations are as follows: SD – Standard rates; D – Decline 
 
SD Load Defer D Exclude Term Total Total per Benefit 
Family history (8) 1 4 1 2 8
Positive genetic test (9) 1 2 5 1 9
Medical history (11) 1 2 1 6 1 11
Medical and Family history(12) 4 5 2 1 12 40
Family history (9) 3 4 2 9
Genetic test (8) 1 6 1 8
Medical history (12) 1 2 1 6 2 12
Medical and Family history (11) 4 5 2 11 40
Family history (8) 3 3 2 8
Genetic test (8) 1 6 1 8
Medical history (11) 1 3 1 4 2 11
Medical and Family history (10) 2 1 5 2 10 37
Family history(2) 1 1 2
Genetic test (2) 2 2
Medical history (2) 2 2
Medical and Family history (2) 2 2 8
Family history (8) 3 3 2 8
Genetic test (7) 1 5 1 7
Medical history (12) 1 2 1 6 2 12
Medical and Family history (11) 3 5 3 11 38
Capital Disability
Income Disability
Core Critical Illness 
Benefit
Underwriting informationBenefit Factors
Number of responses for different underwriting decisions
Comprehensive Critical 
Illness Benefit
More lenient 
decisions based on 
an age greater 
than 45 and 
55years in 
response to a FH & 
55years for a 
genetic test.  
Medical 
information 
relates to 
symptoms.
Life cover
SD Load Defer D Exclude Term Total
Total per 
benefit 
Family history (9) 6 3 9
Genetic test (9) 2 6 1 9
Medical history (10) 6 2 1 1 10
Medical and Family history (12) 5 5 1 1 12 40
Family history (8) 4 3 1 8
Genetic test (9) 2 4 1 1 1 9
Medical history (9) 4 3 2 9
Medical and Family history (11) 5 3 2 1 11 37
Family history (8) 4 3 1 8
Genetic test (8) 2 3 1 1 1 8
Medical history (10) 5 3 2 10
Medical and Family history (11) 5 3 2 1 11 37
Family history (8) 2 2 1 3 8
Genetic test (10) 1 1 3 5 10
Medical history (10) 1 3 1 2 3 10
Medical and Family history (15) 4 3 3 2 3 15 43
Number of responses for different underwriting decisions
Factors Benefit Underwriting information
Life cover
Income Disability
Comprehensive Critical 
Illness Benefit
Medical history of 
applicant; age of 
applicant, if 
younger than 
specified age  then 
are terms applied 
otherwise 
standard rates.   
Prophylactic 
treatment 
considered by one. 
Capital Disability
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 Table H3:  Insurers underwriting decisions for Haemophilia 
 
Please note that the abbreviations are as follows: SD – Standard rates; D – Decline 
 
Table H4:  Insurers underwriting decisions for cardiovascular disease 
 
Please note that the abbreviations are as follows: SD – Standard rates; D – Decline 
 
 
SD Load Defer D Exclude Term Total
Total per 
benefit
Family history (13) 5 6 2 13
Genetic test (13) 3 7 3 13
Medical history (15) 4 7 4 15
Medical and Family history 4 7 4 15 56
Family history (14) 5 6 3 14
Genetic test (13) 4 6 3 13
Medical history (15) 4 7 4 15
Medical and Family history (15) 4 7 4 15 57
Family history (14) 5 6 3 14
Genetic test (12) 3 6 3 12
Medical history (15) 4 7 4 15
Medical and Family history (15) 4 7 4 15 56
Family history (13) 3 7 3 13
Genetic test (13) 3 6 3 1 13
Medical history (15) 4 6 4 1 15
Medical and Family history (14) 4 7 3 14 55
FactorsBenefit Underwriting information
Life cover
Capital Disability
Income Disability
Number of responses for different underwriting decisions
Medical status of 
individual.  In 
particular 
cholesterol levels 
and ECG results
Comprehensive Critical 
Illness Benefit
SD Load Defer D Exclude Term Total
Total per 
benefit 
Family history (9) 6 2 1 9
Genetic test (13) 4 7 2 13
Medical history (14) 4 7 2 1 14
Medical and Family history (15) 5 6 1 3 15 51
Family history (9) 6 1 2 9
Genetic test (14) 3 7 4 14
Medical history (14) 3 7 4 14
Medical and Family history  (16) 5 6 1 4 16 53
Family history (9) 6 1 2 9
Genetic test (14) 3 7 4 14
Medical history (14) 3 7 4 14
Medical and Family history (16) 5 5 1 5 16 53
Family history (2) 2 2
Genetic test (2) 1 1 2
Medical history (2) 1 1 2
Medical and Family history (2) 1 1 2 8
Family history (9) 6 1 2 9
Genetic test (12) 3 5 3 1 12
Medical history (12) 3 5 3 1 12
Medical and Family history (12) 3 5 3 1 12 45
Life cover
Gender - male. 
Medical history 
and disease status.
Benefit Underwriting information Factors 
Number of responses for different underwriting decisions
Income Disability
Core Critical Illness Benefit
Comprehensive Critical Illness 
Benefit
Capital Disability
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Appendix I:  Long-term Insurance Ombudsman non-
disclosure cases 
 
Table I: Number of non-disclosure cases referred to Ombudsman and their 
response in favour of the life-insured 
Reporting 
Year 
Life Cover benefits Disability benefits 
Total number 
of cases 
Ruling in 
favour of 
applicant    
(% of Total) 
Total number 
of cases 
Ruling in 
favour of 
applicant   
(% of Total) 
2003 120 28 139 15 
2004 111 18 104 17 
2005 109 14 85 28 
2006 106 32 39 36 
2007 103 30 33 45 
2008 79 24 29 24 
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APPENDIX J: Administrative functions in relation to genetic 
tests 
Table J.1: Insurers administrative practices that correspond to regulations 
 
 
Table J.2: Reinsurers administrative practices that correspond to regulation 
 
 
 
Yes No Qualification Yes No
Standard storage & 
confidentiality
1 x
Chief 
underwriters 
and medical 
practitioners
x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO CMO and Reinsurers
Medical specialists, 
pathologists or 
reinsurers.
Specialist physician
2 x CMO x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO and Genetics 
Department University 
Stellenbosch
No training needed CMO Clinical geneticist
3 x x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO and Reinsurer None to date CMO and Reinsurer Specialist physician
4 x x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO CMO CMO
5 x x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO and Reinsurer
None.  Reinsurance 
seminars.
CMO Specialist physician
6 x CMO x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
Pathologists and medical 
specialists
CMO
Pathologists and 
Geneticists 
7 x
Insurer's 
medical 
doctors
x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
CMO and Reinsurer None CMO and Reinsurer Cardiologist
8 x x
Data system with defined 
security priviledges
Pathologists None None
Insurer
Genetic underwriter Protocol to store info
Interpretation of genetic 
test results
Training in Genetics
Medical specialists - 
genetic
CMO Qualifications
Yes No Qualification Yes No Standard storage 
confidentiality
1 x
Senior 
underwriter 
(nursing sister 
extensive years 
of experience in 
insurance)
x Data system with defined security priviledges
CMO, pathology 
laboratory, Internet 
(Google)
Nobody.  Part of training 
course provided to 
insurers
No need to date but 
reinsurers can contact 
their resources in the field
Specialist physician
2 x CMO x Data system with defined security priviledges CMO CMO and pricing actuary
Laboratories that 
performed the test 
(Lancet,Wits)
GP with extensive years  
of experience in the 
insurance industry 
3 x CMO x Data system with defined security priviledges
CMO and international 
specialists
CMO ad international 
specialists CMO  Specialist physician
4 x
Underwriters 
aware to 
address genetic 
information with 
caution
x Data system with defined security priviledges
CMO and international 
specialists
No specific training.  Part 
of underwriting manual.  
Underwriting training has 
a section on genetics
CMOs Specialist physicians
5 x
Global 
approach of the 
reinsurance 
company
x Data system with defined security priviledges
CMO and reinsurer's 
international specialists 
Internal underwriting 
manual Local and global experts 
Medical specialists CMO QualificationsReinsurer
Genetic underwriter Protocol to store info Interpretation of genetic 
test results Training in Genetics
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